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Overview
In this dissertation, we investigate the roles of interest-rate control in dynamic
economies with capital accumulation. In the theoretical studies on monetary macro-
dynamics, it was usually assumed that the growth rate of nominal money supply is
kept constant. However, the stance of many central banks have recently the shifted
from the base-money targeting to the interest-rate control. Moreover, Taylor (1993)
shows that central bank’s behavior such as the Federal Reserve System can be as-
sumed that it controls the rate of nominal interest by responding to the rate of
inflation and to the income level. Therefore, in the literature, it becomes popular to
specify the interest-control rule as monetary policy When the central bank controls
nominal interest rate, money supply is endogenously determined, and thus the ef-
fects of monetary policy is more complex than the case of constant money growth.
If there are multiple equilibria, the rational expectations equilibrium path of the
economy is indeterminate so that sunspot-driven changes in expectations can gen-
erate economic fluctuations. The interest-control rule may enhance macroeconomic
instability if it is not appropriately implemented. The central concern of this dis-
sertation is a relevant relationship between the interest-rate control and aggregate
stability of the economy.
There has been a large numbers of studies on the issue mentioned above. The ear-
lier studies such as Benhabib et. al. (2001a) focus on the model without investment
and reveal that equilibrium indeterminacy easily emerges under the Taylor-type
interest-rate control. The recent studies consider models including capital accumu-
lation and show that destabilization effect of interest-rate control would be smaller
in models with investment. For example, Dupor (2001) shows that determinacy
does not appear if the policy is active. It is to be noted that many of recent stud-
ies on models with interest-rate control employ New Keynesian frameworks with
sticky prices and monopolistic competition. In fact, Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005)
and Huang and Meng (2007), who analyze a discrete-time version of Dupor (2001),
claim that not only the strength of monetary policy rule but also other factors such
vi
vii
as the monopolistic distortion affect the uniqueness of equilibrium path. Therefore,
the roles of monetary policy and capital accumulation for equilibrium determinacy
tend to be rather ambiguous in these sticky-price models.
We use only the flexible-price models in this dissertation to clarify the stabi-
lization effect of interest-rate control in economies with capital accumulation. More
specifically, this dissertation focuses on the following issues:
(i) timing and equilibrium determinacy under interest-rate control;
(ii) long-run effects of interest-control rule in endogenously growing economies;
(iii) interaction between fiscal and monetary policy.
Chapters 1 and 3 discuss the issue (i), Chapters 2-4 deal with issue (ii), and Chapter
5 is devoted to issue (iii). Each chapter is summarized as follows.
In Chapter 1, we examine the relation between the types of interest rate rules
and equilibrium determinacy. We construct a money-in-the-utility-function model
that involves a neo-classical production function as in Meng and Yip (2004). We use
a discrete-time model to consider the alternative timings of the real money holdings
in the utility and of the inflation rate in monetary policy rule. It is shown that
the results of determinacy heavily depends on the timing of the inflation rate in
interest-rate control. This is in contrast to endowment economy as in Benhabib et.
al (2001).
Chapter 2 constructs a continuous-time AK growth model. Money is introduced
via a standard money-in-the-utility formulation so that the balanced-growth path
is unique and money is superneutral in the long run. We show that even in this
simple environment the interest-rate feedback rule a´ la Taylor (1993) may produce
indeterminacy of equilibrium if the monetary authority adjusts the nominal interest
rate in response to the growth rate of real income as well as to the rate of inflation.
In Chapter 3, we re-examine the model in Chapter 2 by use of a discrete-time
formulation. Unlike the continuous-time model in Chapter 2, we can demonstrate
that equilibrium determinacy depends on the timing of money holding of households
as well. The role of timing in the endogenous growth model can be more clearly
seen than in the exogenous growth (Chapter 1).
Chapter 4 also assumes that the central bank adjusts the nominal interest rate in
response not only to the inflation but also to the growth rate of real income. We ana-
lyze an AK model with a cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint in which money balance
viii
binds not only consumption but also investment so that money is not superneu-
tral on the balanced-growth path (BGP). We first analyze equilibrium determinacy
around the BGP and find that the result is sensitive to the choice of interest-rate
control rule. In the latter half, we focus on the long-run relation between velocity of
money and the rate of nominal money growth. We again confirm that the relation
is closely related to what type of interest-rate control is employed.
In Chapter 5, we study stabilization effects of fiscal and monetary policy rules
in the context of a standard real business cycle model with money. We assume that
the fiscal authority adjusts the rate of income tax subject to the balanced-budget
constraint as in Guo and Lansing (1998), while the monetary authority controls the
nominal interest rate by observing inflation. We demonstrate that whether or not
policy rules eliminate the possibility of sunspot-driven fluctuations critically depends
upon the appropriate combination of progressiveness of taxation and activeness of
interest-rate control.
Chapter 1
Timing, Interest-Rate Control,
and Equilibrium Determinacy
with Capital Accumulation
1.1 Introduction
It has been known that in monetary dynamic models without capital accumulation
(investment), the equilibrium path is uniquely determined if monetary policy rule
a´ la Taylor (1993) is active in the sense that the monetary authority adjusts the
nominal interest rate in response to the inflation rate more than one for one 1. How-
ever, recent studies have shown that this result may not hold when the economic
model includes capital accumulation. Among others, Meng and Yip (2004) examine
a continuous-time money-in-the-utility-function (MIUF) model with flexible prices
and demonstrate that equilibrium determinacy tends to hold regardless of types of
interest rate control rules. Most of the studies on the relationship between the equi-
librium determinacy and monetary policy rule with investment assume that price
adjustments are sluggish. Using a continuous-time model with monopolistic compe-
tition and sluggish prices, Dupor (2001) shows that equilibrium determinacy holds
if the monetary policy is passive, while determinacy does not appear if the policy
is active. Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005) and Huang and Meng (2007) analyze the
1Benhabib et. al. (2001a) show that in a model without capital determinacy may depend not
only on the types of the policy rule but also on the substitutability of consumption and real money
balances.
1
2discrete-time version of Dupor (2001) 2 . They conclude that not only the strength
of monetary policy rule but also other factors such as the monopolistic distortion af-
fect the uniqueness of equilibrium. Although these findings are interesting, the role
of capital is rather ambiguous in the sticky-price models, because adding a price
adjustment mechanism may alter the dynamic structure of a model economy.
Unlike the mainstream literature mentioned above, this chapter examines the
stabilization role of interest-rate control in a standard neoclassical monetary growth
model with flexible prices and fixed labor supply. We use a discrete-time monetary
growth model in which money is introduced via the MIUF formulation. In a discrete-
time MIUF model with an interest-rate control rule, two kinds of timings would be
critical. First, in discrete-time MIUF models, we should specify the timing of money
holding. The timing of money balance holding can be classified into the cases of
cash-in-advance (CIA) and cash-when-I’m-done (CWID). The CIA (resp. CWID)
timing means that the money balances held for transactions are the stock of money
that household has before entering (resp. after leaving) the goods market trading 3.
Second, in the discrete-time settings, we can easily distinguish the current-looking
rule from the forward-looking interest control rules, according to the difference of the
timing of the inflation rate which is used as an index of monetary policy 4. Therefore,
we can consider the following cases: (i) CIA timing with a forward-looking rule; (ii)
CIA timing with a current-looking rule; (iii) CWID timing with a forward-looking
rule; and (iv) CWID timing with a current-looking rule. In this chapter, we analyze
the relation between equilibrium determinacy and interest-rate control rules in all
of these four patterns of formulations.
The main results of this chapter are as follows. First, we confirm that the equi-
librium path tends to be determinate under the forward-looking rule. Second, under
the current-looking rule, determinacy holds if the policy is active, while indetermi-
nacy can emerge if the policy is passive. Note that these results also generally hold
in the flexible-price economy without capital. Therefore, our finding means that
2Dupor (2001) and Huang and Meng (2007) assume that the instantaneous utility function is
additively separable between consumption and money balances. On the other hand, Carlstrom
and Fuerst (2005) use a non-separable utility function.
3The discrete-time MIUF models usually assume CWID timing as in Carlstrom and Fuerst
(2005) and Huang and Meng (2007). However, as Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) claim, it is difficult
to justify CWID timing on theoretical grounds, since this assumption means that the money held
at the beginning of t+ 1 reduces transaction costs in period t.
4Backward-looking rule as in Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000) can be considered, but it is analyti-
cally difficult and used not so much.
3introducing capital accumulation does not make a remarkable qualitative change in
dynamic behaviors of the model economy. Nevertheless, we can show that deter-
minacy may hold more easily in the economy with capital than in the one without
capital. This is because adding capital stock as a predetermined variable to the
dynamic system reduces the possibility of equilibrium indeterminacy in our flexible-
price economy. Our analysis also demonstrates that the presence of capital makes
the role of timing of money holdings less relevant in equilibrium determinacy.
It is to be noted that Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) and Meng and Yip (2004)
also discuss stabilization effects of interest-rate control in flexible-price models with
capital accumulation. Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) utilize a discrete-time model
and focus on the timings of money holdings in a MIUF, but they investigate only
the case of forward-looking interest-rate control 5. In addition, they assume that
labor supply is endogenously determined. Since the assumption of variable labor
could be an additional source of equilibrium indeterminacy, our model with fixed
labor supply is useful for investigating the effects of capital stock in a clear manner.
Meng and Yip (2004) use a continuous-time neoclassical growth model with MIUF
and conclude that the equilibrium path is generally determinate regardless of the
form of interest-rate control rule 6. Our study demonstrates that their conclusion
depends heavily upon their continuous-time formulation in which timings plays no
role.
1.2 The Model
We use the standard Sidrauski-type formulation. The economy consists of a contin-
uum of identical household-firms with a unit mass. The agent maximizes his lifetime
utility
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct,mt−J), 0 < β < 1, J = 0 or 1, (1.1)
subject to the flow budget constraint
kt+1 − (1− δ)kt + ct +mt + bt + τt = yt + mt−1
pit
+
Rt−1bt−1
pit
. (1.2)
5The most monetary models that use discrete-time formulation also focus on specific timings
of household’s money holding and interest-rate control.
6Chapter 2 and 3 using an endogenous growth model show that the form of monetary policy
rule can be significant for equilibrium determinacy.
4The instantaneous utility function u(ct,mt−J) is assumed to satisfy uc > 0, um > 0,
ucc < 0, umm < 0, uccum−ucmuc < 0, and ummuc−ucmum < 0. That is, the utility
function is strictly increasing and strictly concave in c and m, and consumption c
and real money balances m are both normal goods. We define J = 1 as cash-in-
advance (CIA) timing, and J = 0 as cash-when-I’m-done (CWID) timing 7.
The production function is given by yt = f(kt), where f(kt) satisfies f
′′(kt) < 0 <
f ′(kt). We assume that labor supply is inelastic. The government budget constraint
is the following:
mt + bt + τt = gt +
mt−1
pit
+
Rt−1bt−1
pit
, (1.3)
where gt = g ≥ 0 is the real government spending which is assumed to be fixed.
From (1.2) and (1.3), we obtain the goods-market equilibrium condition:
kt+1 = f(kt) + (1− δ)kt − ct − g.
We assume that the monetary policy rule follows the Taylor principle, in which
the central bank controls the nominal interest rate by responding to either the
current and expected future inflation rate. The control rule of the gross nominal
interest rate is given by
Rt = R(pit, pit+1), where R1 ≡ ∂Rt
∂pit
≥ 0 and R2 ≡ ∂Rt
∂pit+1
≥ 0. (1.4)
Rt = R(pit, pit+1) is a continuous, nondecreasing, and strictly positive function of
pit and pit+1. We assume that there exists at least one steady-state inflation rate
p¯i > β such that R(p¯i, p¯i) =
p¯i
β
> 1. If R1 > 0 and R2 = 0, the interest rate rule
is current-looking, and it is forward-looking when R1 = 0 and R2 > 0. It means
that the monetary policy is active if βR¯2 > 1 (resp. βR¯1 > 1), and it is passive
7Each variable means the following:
β=the time discounting rate;
ct =real consumption;
mt−J=real money balances at the beginning of period t− J + 1 (J = 0, 1);
kt=(per capita) stock of capital;
δ=the depreciation rate (0 < δ < 1);
Pt=the nominal price level;
bt=real bonds at the end of period;
τt=lump-sum tax;
yt=net income;
pit ≡ Pt
Pt−1
=the gross rate of inflation;
Rt−1=the gross nominal interest rate set at period t− 1.
5if βR¯2 < 1 (resp. βR¯1 < 1) under the forward-looking (resp. the current-looking)
rule.
1.3 Cash-in-advance(CIA) Timing
1.3.1 The Dynamic System
The CIA timing implies that the money balances held for transactions are the money
balances that household has before entering the goods market, and thus the util-
ity function is given by u(ct,mt−1). To derive the optimality conditions for the
household’s consumption plan, set up the following Lagrangian function:
LCIA ≡
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
u(ct,mt−1)+λt
[
−kt+1+(1−δ)kt−ct−mt−bt−τt+f(kt)+mt−1
pit
+
Rt−1bt−1
pit
]}
.
(1.5)
The first-order conditions for the household’s optimization problem are:
λt = uc(ct,mt−1); (1.6)
um(ct,mt−1) =
λt−1
β
− λt
pit
; (1.7)
λt−1 = βλt[f ′(kt) + 1− δ]; (1.8)
λt =
βλt+1Rt
pit+1
; (1.9)
lim
t→∞
βt+1λt+1kt+1 = 0; (1.10)
lim
t→∞
βtλtmt = 0; (1.11)
lim
t→∞
βtλtbt = 0. (1.12)
The trasversality conditions are equations (1.10)-(1.12).
The complete dynamic system in the CIA timing is described by following:
kt+1 − f(kt)− (1− δ)kt + ct + g = 0; (1.13)
βuc(ct+1,mt)[f
′(kt+1) + 1− δ]− uc(ct,mt−1) = 0; (1.14)
um(ct+1,mt)
uc(ct+1,mt)
− R(pit, pit+1)− 1
pit+1
= 0; (1.15)
R(pit, pit+1)− pit+1[f ′(kt+1) + 1− δ] = 0. (1.16)
6Equation (1.13) is the goods-market equilibrium condition. From (1.6) and (1.8),
we obtain (1.14), which presents the Euler equation. Equations (1.7), (1.8) and
(1.9) yield (1.15) and (1.16), which respectively express the money-demand function
(the relation between the marginal rate of substitution and the opportunity cost
for holding money) and the Fisher equation (the no-arbitrage relationship between
bonds and capital) .
In the steady state, all the real variables remain constant over time, that is, in
the case of CIA, from (1.13)-(1.16) we obtain the following conditions:
f(k¯) = δk¯ + c¯+ g, (1.17)
f ′(k¯) + 1− δ = 1
β
, (1.18)
um(c¯, m¯)
uc(c¯, m¯)
=
R(p¯i, p¯i)− 1
p¯i
, (1.19)
R(p¯i, p¯i)− p¯i[f ′(k¯) + 1− δ] = 0. (1.20)
In the above, z¯ represents the steady-state value of variable z. From (1.18), the
nontrivial steady-state level of capital uniquely exists because of the property of the
production function, f(k). Substituting this steady-state value of capital into (1.17)
and (1.20), we can derive a unique set of the steady-state levels of consumption and
the inflation rate. If we assume that there exists at least one steady-state inflation
rate p¯i > β such thatR(p¯i, p¯i) =
p¯i
β
> 1, then p¯i is uniquely determined by (1.20)
under a given level of k¯. Finally, we obtain a unique steady-state level of real money
holdings from (1.19).
The dynamic system linearized at the steady state consists of the following:
kˆt+1 − 1
β
kˆt + cˆt = 0, (1.21)
βu¯cf¯
′′kˆt+1 + u¯cc(cˆt+1 − cˆt) + u¯cm(mˆt − mˆt−1) = 0, (1.22)
p¯iS¯ccˆt+1 + p¯iS¯mmˆt − R¯1pˆit −
(
R¯2 − 1
β
+
1
p¯i
)
pˆit+1 = 0, and (1.23)
−p¯if¯ ′′kˆt+1 +
(
R¯2 − 1
β
)
pˆit+1 + R¯1pˆit = 0. (1.24)
In the above, zˆt ≡ zt − z¯ and S(c,m) ≡ um(c,m)
uc(c,m)
, where Sc(c,m) ≡ ∂S
∂c
=
ucmuc − umucc
(uc)2
> 0 and Sm(c,m) ≡ ∂S
∂m
= −ucmum − ucumm
(uc)2
< 0.
71.3.2 Forward-looking Rule
Under the forward-looking interest rate rule where R¯1 = 0 and R¯2 > 0, (1.23) and
(1.24) are respectively replaced with (1.25) and (1.26) below:
p¯iS¯ccˆt+1 + p¯iS¯mmˆt −
(
R¯2 − 1
β
+
1
p¯i
)
pˆit+1 = 0, (1.25)
−p¯if¯ ′′kˆt+1 +
(
R¯2 − 1
β
)
pˆit+1 = 0. (1.26)
From (1.21), (1.22), (1.25) and (1.26), we can eliminate mˆ and pˆi to derive a reduced
form dynamic system in the following manner:
[
kˆt+1
cˆt+1
]
=

1
β
−1
− S¯m
s
(
u¯cf¯
′′ +
(
1
β
− 1
)
f¯ ′′X1u¯cm
S¯m
)
S¯m
s
(
βu¯cf¯
′′ +
f¯ ′′X1u¯cm
S¯m
)
+ 1

[
kˆt
cˆt
]
,
(1.27)
where X1 ≡ 1 + 1
R¯(βR¯2 − 1), and s ≡
u¯ccu¯mm − (u¯cm)2
u¯c
> 0.
Since there is one predetermined variable kˆt and one jump variable cˆt, in the
system (1.27), determinacy of equilibrium in this system, which means that there
is a unique equilibrium path under a given initial capital stock, is satisfied if one
eigenvalue is outside the unit circle and the other is inside the unit circle. There is
more detailed explanation for analytical results and drawing figures in the Appendix
1.A. Then, we have shown the following proposition and Figure 1.1:
Proposition 1.1 In the economy with the CIA timing under the forward-looking
interest rate rule, the equilibrium path is determinate if u¯cm(βR¯2 − 1) ≤ 0. When
u¯cm(βR¯2 − 1) > 0, the equilibrium path may be determinate or non-stationary (un-
stable).
1.3.3 Current-looking Rule
Under the current-looking rule where R¯1 > 0 and R¯2 = 0, the dynamic system
around the steady state consists (1.21), (1.22), and
p¯iS¯ccˆt+1 + p¯iS¯mmˆt − R¯1pˆit −
(
− 1
β
+
1
p¯i
)
pˆit+1 = 0, (1.28)
−p¯if¯ ′′kˆt+1 − 1
β
pˆit+1 + R¯1pˆit = 0. (1.29)
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Figure 1.1: Determinacy of the CIA timing with forward-looking rule
These equations are summarized as
kˆt+1cˆt+1
pˆit+1
 =

1
β
−1 0
− f¯
′′
s
(u¯mm − u¯cm) βf¯
′′u¯mm
s
+ 1 − u¯cm
p¯i2s
(βR¯1 − 1)
−p¯if¯ ′′ p¯if¯ ′′β βR¯1

kˆtcˆt
pˆit
 . (1.30)
Since the system (1.30) consists of one predetermined variable, kˆt, and two jump
variables, cˆt and pˆit, the equilibrium is determinate if there are two eigenvalues
outside the unit circle and one eigenvalue inside the unit circle. We explain the
more detailed calculation in Appendix 1.A. The graphical result is displayed in
Figure 1.2, and the argument is summarized as the following:
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Figure 1.2: Determinacy of the CIA timing with current-looking rule
Proposition 1.2 In the economy with the CIA timing under the current-looking
interest rate rule, there generally exists a unique equilibrium path if the policy is
active, while indeterminacy can emerge if the policy is passive. Non-stationarity
might arise when the policy rule is slightly passive and the consumption and real
money balances are highly Edgeworth substitute.
1.4 Cash-when-I’m-done(CWID) Timing
The CWID timing assumes that real money balances aided in transactions are ones
that household holds after leaving the store. In the CWID timing model, the La-
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grangian function is rewritten as the following:
LCWID ≡
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
u(ct,mt)+λt
[
−kt+1+(1−δ)kt−ct−mt−bt−τt+f(kt)+mt−1
pit
+
Rt−1bt−1
pit
]}
.
(1.31)
The first-order conditions for the household’s optimization problem are:
λt = uc(ct,mt); (1.32)
um(ct,mt) = λt − βλt+1
pit+1
; (1.33)
(1.8), and (1.9). Equations (1.10)-(1.12) are the transversality conditions.
The complete dynamic system in the CWID timing is described by (1.13), (1.16),
and
βuc(ct+1,mt+1)[f
′(kt+1) + 1− δ]− uc(ct,mt) = 0, (1.34)
um(ct,mt)
uc(ct,mt)
− R(pit, pit+1)− 1
R(pit, pit+1)
= 0. (1.35)
The meaning and derivation of each equation are similar as those in Section 1.3.1.
Real money balances which effect the marginal utility of consumption in the current
period are ones held at the end of that period in the CWID timing, while they are
ones held at the end of the previous period in the CIA timing. The opportunity
cost of holding money is discounted by the real rate of interest. The steady-state
conditions are almost the same as those in the CIA model except for
um(c¯, m¯)
uc(c¯, m¯)
= 1− 1
R(p¯i, p¯i)
, (1.36)
instead of (1.19), which is obtained from (1.35). As well as in the CIA model, it is
easy to show that the nontrivial steady state uniquely exists in the CWID model.
We linearize the complete dynamic system around the steady state. The resulting
linearized system consists of (1.21), (1.24), and the following two equations:
βu¯cf¯
′′kˆt+1 + u¯cc(cˆt+1 − cˆt) + u¯cm(mˆt+1 − mˆt) = 0, (1.37)
R¯2S¯ccˆt + R¯
2S¯mmˆt − R¯1pˆit − R¯2pˆit+1 = 0. (1.38)
In the case of the forward-looking rule (R¯1 = 0 and R¯2 > 0), Figure 1.3 and the
following proposition summarize our finding:
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Figure 1.3: Determinacy of the CWID timing with forward-looking rule
Proposition 1.3 In the economy with the CWID timing and the forward-looking
interest rate rule, the determinacy of equilibrium generally holds. Indeterminacy
could emerge, if the policy rule is slightly active and consumption and real money
balances are highly Edgeworth substitute.
The result under the current-looking rule (R¯1 > 0 and R¯2 = 0) is described by
Figure 1.4 and it is summarized as:
Proposition 1.4 In the economy with the CWID timing under the current-looking
interest rate rule, active policy rule generates equilibrium determinacy, while inde-
terminacy can be produced under passive policy rule. When consumption and real
12
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Figure 1.4: Determinacy of the CWID timing with current-looking rule
money balances are highly Edgeworth complement, the slightly active policy rule
might emerge indeterminacy.
We show the detailed manipulation in Appendix 1.B.
1.5 Discussion
1.5.1 A General Consideration
We claim the general points which may be critical to capture the differences in results
under alternative formulations. To begin with, we consider the role of capital. As a
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Table 1.1: Equilibrium determinacy under forward-looking rule
forward-looking rule CIA CWID
with capital ucm < 0 ucm = 0 ucm > 0 ucm < 0 ucm = 0 ucm > 0
active D D D(, NS) D D D
passive D(, NS) D D D(, I) D D
without capital ucm < 0 ucm = 0 ucm > 0 ucm < 0 ucm = 0 ucm > 0
active I D D I D D
passive D D I D D I
*D=determinate, I=indeterminate, NS=non-stationary(unstable)
Table 1.2: Equilibrium determinacy under current-looking rule
current-looking rule CIA CWID
with capital ucm < 0 ucm = 0 ucm > 0 ucm < 0 ucm = 0 ucm > 0
active D D D D D D(, I)
passive I(, NS) I I I I I
without capital ucm < 0 ucm = 0 ucm > 0 ucm < 0 ucm = 0 ucm > 0
active I D D D D D
passive D I I I I I
*D=determinate, I=indeterminate, NS=non-stationary(unstable)
rule, in the model without capital, production (and thus consumption) is determined
by a given endowment. In this case, the dynamic system consists of two jump
variables, that is, real money holdings and the inflation rate. Tables 1.1 and 1.2
summarize the equilibrium determining results under alternative specifications of
policy rules and the timing of real money balances. As for the model without
capital, we classify the case of CWID according to Benhabib et. al. (2001a), and we
calculate the case of CIA by ourselves. There are some differences between the results
of the models with and without capital. First, the possibility of non-stationary
equilibrium may exist in the model with capital, while it does not exist without
capital. Second, while the property of MIUF such as the timing of money holdings
and the Edgeworth complementarity between consumption and real money balances
may affect equilibrium determinacy in the absence of capital, these effects are mostly
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negligible in the models with capital. The main reason for such a difference is that
capital as a state (non-jumpable) variable works like an anchor. Though this role is
the same as that in the sticky-price models, these models contain other factors such
as monopolistic pricing behavior of firms, so that the meaning of including capital
into the models is less clear.
Next, we examine the difference between the continuous and discrete time for-
mulations. As mentioned in Section 1.1, Meng and Yip (2004) show that in the basic
continuous-time model the equilibrium path uniquely exists regardless whether the
monetary policy is active or passive. Within the discrete-time setting, the result
close to them is derived in the case of the CIA timing under the forward-looking
rule (Section 1.3.2). It generally holds that the discrete-time CIA model converges
to the continuous-time counterpart as the time interval approaches to zero. We
understand the similarity between the continuous-time model and the discrete-time
model with the forward-looking rule by observing the no-arbitrage condition between
capital and bonds. It shows the relation between the current capital and the current
inflation rate in the continuous-time model, while it describes the relation between
these two variables in period t + 1 in the discrete-time model under the forward-
looking rule. The implication is not the same, but both present the intratemporal
relation between capital and the rate of inflation. This point is also mentioned by
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005) who analyze a discrete-time model with sticky prices.
However, examining numerical examples with plausible parameter values, they show
that the range of the monetary policy rule that generates determinacy is very nar-
row. This is in contrast to the flexible-price discrete-time model in this chapter.
Note that in the sticky price model with monopolistic competition, the marginal
cost (or the markup ratio) is an additional jump variable. We may conjecture that
this enhances the possibility of equilibrium indeterminacy in the model discussed by
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005).
1.5.2 Intuitive Implications
Now, we consider the mechanism of equilibrium determinacy in this model. We
assume that the instantaneous utility function is additively separable. Then, the
dynamic system consisting of capital and consumption is the same as the standard
Ramsey model, which has a unique equilibrium path under a given capital stock.
In this case, therefore, equilibrium indeterminacy is generated by monetary factors,
that is, the inflation rate and the real money holdings. As a benchmark, we clarify
15
the mechanism of determinacy (indeterminacy) under the assumption of separable
utility function. When the utility function is not additively separable between con-
sumption and real balances, behavior of the real money balances affect dynamics
of consumption and capital. However, equilibrium determinacy in the model with
capital is almost unaffected by the property of MIUF, and therefore the analysis of
the separable MIUF can be useful.
Suppose that the economy in period T-1 stays at the steady state, and that
the capital in period T is above (and thus the rate of return in period T is below)
its steady-state level. Under this situation, agents anticipate that consumption in
period T is smaller than its steady-state level. It gives a path such that capital
increases and consumption decreases over time, which is not equilibrium in the
normal model since it violates the transversality condition. We examine whether the
path is equilibrium or not. If it is not, determinacy holds. When it is an equilibrium
path, indeterminacy occurs since another path under this given capital stock in which
capital stock and consumption converge to the steady state is equilibrium.
Under the active forward-looking rule, the inflation in period T is below its
steady-state value for lowering the real interest rate according to the arbitrage con-
dition,
R(piT )
piT
= f ′(kT ) + 1 − δ. Capital in period T+1 is larger than in period
T for the goods equilibrium condition, and thus the inflation and consumption in
period T+1 are smaller than in period T. The path is still violating the transver-
sality condition since the inflation does not converge to the steady state. Therefore,
determinacy holds. On the contrary, the rate of inflation in period T is above its
steady-state level for the arbitrage condition when the central bank adopts the pas-
sive forward-looking rule. The inflation rate is rising over time, and the path violates
the transversality condition as above. Determinacy still holds.
Under the current-looking rule, the nominal rate of interest does not change in
period T-1. Corresponding to lowering the real rate of return, the inflation rate in
period T increases according to the arbitrage condition
R(piT−1)
piT
= f ′(kT ) + 1− δ.
The rate of return is falling over time. When the monetary policy rule is active,
the inflation rate is increasing over time since the nominal interest rate is highly
rising. Then, equilibrium determinacy occurs as before. If the passive rule is carried
out, the nominal rate of interest is not so increasing, the inflation is not needed to
increase over time and is diminishing to the steady-state level. Consumption and
capital also converge to their steady-state values. We can show another equilibrium
path with a standard Ramsey model and thus indeterminacy.
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The timing of money holding may play some role, especially under the non-
separable utility. The opportunity cost of holding money is discounted by the real
rate of interest in the CWID timing. Under the assumption that the all variables
are at their steady-state levels in period T-1, the real money balance at the ending
of period T-1 has already been fixed as a steady-state value in the instantaneous
utility in period T in the CIA timing. On the other hand, the real money balance
at the ending of period T may change the instantaneous utility in period T under
the CWID timing. This may bring a difference of equilibrium determinacy, but as
shown above, the difference is not so large in this flexible-price model with capital.
We can roughly say that the Taylor rule satisfying one at least of the forward-
looking or active property brings a unique path for equilibrium. In this chapter, we
focus on the extreme monetary policy rules in which the central bank respond to
either the forward or current inflation rate. In reality, the monetary authority adopts
a ”mixed” rule in which the nominal interest rate responds to both the forward and
current inflation rates. Under the mixed rule, the result in this chapter may be
overturned. We do not mention a detailed calculation, but we can consider one
example by applying the above-mentioned intuition. We assume monetary policy
such that a reaction to the forward inflation rate is much stronger than the current
rate. When the inflation rate in period T is anticipated to increase, the inflation
rate in period T+1 is not needed to increase so much since the respond to the
forward inflation rate is very strong. As a result, the inflation rate converges to its
steady-state level, and indeterminacy may generate.
1.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we analyze the relation between the interest-rate control rules and
equilibrium determinacy in the discrete-time, flexible-price economic model with
capital. We have shown that the equilibrium path tends to be determinate under the
forward-looking rule. Under the current-looking rule, determinacy holds if the policy
is active, while indeterminacy may emerge if the policy is passive one. As examined
in Section 1.5.1, this depends on the structural difference and similarity between
the continuous-time model and the discrete-time one, and thus indeterminacy is
generated in contrast to Meng and Yip (2004). In the flexible-price economy, these
results are generally robust. However, we have confirmed that determinacy may
easily (indeterminacy may hardly) hold in the economy with capital in which capital
stock works as a state variable. In this context, we see that neither the timing of
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money holdings nor complementarity between consumption and real money holdings,
is significant for equilibrium determinacy. It is the monetary policy rule that is
critical for equilibrium determinacy in our setting.
As for examining the robustness of our results, we may extend our discussion in
several ways. For instance, we can introduce fiscal rules into the model. As discussed
by Leeper (1991), it would be interesting to consider the interaction between fiscal
and monetary policy rules. Some authors have discussed this issue in dynamic
settings, but most of the existing studies have analyzed models without capital
formation: see, for example, Evans and Honkapohja (2007). It is to be noted that
Benhabib and Eusepi (2005) and Lubik (2003) consider fiscal rules in models with
sticky prices and capital accumulation. Their results can be reconsidered in the
context of our flexible-price setting.
Appendix 1.A: Manipulation of the CIA Timing
Model
Forward-looking Rule
The characteristic equation of (1.27) is
p1(µ) = µ
2 −
(
1 +
1
β
− S¯m
s
(
−βu¯cf¯ ′ − f¯
′′X1u¯cm
S¯m
))
µ+
1
β
+
f¯ ′′X1u¯cm
s
. (1.39)
Table 1.3 displays the relation between the equilibrium determinacy and the
characteristic equation. Determinacy of equilibrium in this system, which means
that there is a unique equilibrium path under a given initial capital stock, is satisfied
if one eigenvalue is outside the unit circle and the other is inside the unit circle. It
can be easily checked that two roots are real. Since p1(1) = (µ1 − 1)(µ2 − 1) =
− S¯mβu¯cf¯
′′
s
< 0, determinacy holds if p1(−1) > 0, and non-stationary equilibria,
in which there are no equilibrium path under a given initial capital stock, exist
if p1(−1) < 0, where p1(−1) = (µ1+1)(µ2+1) = 2
(
1+
1
β
+
f¯ ′′X1u¯cm
s
)
+
S¯mβu¯cf¯
′′
s
.
It means that we can theoretically reject the possibility of indeterminacy in this case.
We find that X1ucm < 0 is a sufficient condition for p1(−1) > 0, that is,
for equilibrium determinacy, but is not a necessary condition. Similarly, in other
cases, it is difficult to find analytically the necessary and sufficient conditions for
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Table 1.3: Determinacy and the characteristic equation under the forward-looking
rule
p(−1) > 0 p(−1) < 0
p(1) > 0 1)Non-stationary: p(0) > 1 Determinate
2)Indeterminate: p(0) < 1
p(1) < 0 Determinate Non-stationary
equilibrium determinacy. We now specify the following example:
u(ct,mt−J) =
(cρ1t m
ρ2
t−J)
1−σ
1− σ , ρ1, ρ2 > 0, σ > 0; (1.40)
f(kt) = Ak
γ
t , 0 < γ < 1; (1.41)
Rt = R(pit+j) = R¯
(
pit+j
p¯i
)α
, α > 0, and j = 0, 1. (1.42)
Note that in the above it holds that
sign(1− σ) = sign(ucm)
and that
R¯j+1 ≡ ∂Rt
∂pit+j
∣∣∣∣
ss
=
α
β
.
Then, p1(−1) is rewritten as
p1(−1) = 2
(
1 +
1
β
)
+ c¯
Aγ(1− γ)
k¯2−γ
{
−2
(
1 +
1
R¯(α− 1)
)
ρ2(1− σ) p¯i
R¯− 1 + β
}
,
which is a function of ρ2(1− σ) and α. We account the reason why the parameter
ρ2(1− σ) is important in Appendix 1.A. Suppose that A = 1, γ = 0.35, β = 0.99 =
1
R¯
(: p¯i = 1), δ = 0.02, and that g = 0.5. These functional forms and values are
frequently assumed in the literature, and are coordinated to depict an epitome of
the actual economy 8. Using these typical parameter values, the classification of
equilibrium determining in (βR2, ρ2(1− σ)) space is depicted by Figure 9 1.1.
8The steady-state values are
(k¯, c¯, R¯, y¯) =
([
Aγ
1
β − 1 + δ
] 1
1−γ
, Ak¯γ − δk¯ − g, p¯i
β
,Ak¯γ
)
= (43.572, 2.376, 1.010, 3.747).
These values are the same in the two models except for real money balances, m¯ =
ρ2
ρ1
c¯
p¯i
R¯− 1 in
the CIA timing and m¯ =
ρ2
ρ1
c¯
R¯
R¯− 1 in the CWID timing.
9Figure 1.2-1.4 shown below also use those parameter values.
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Table 1.4: Determinacy and the characteristic equation under the current-looking
rule
p(−1) > 0 p(−1) < 0
p(1) > 0 1)Non-stationary Determinate
: p(0) > 1 and q > 0
2)Indeterminate
p(1) < 0 1)Determinate 1)Non-stationary
:(i)q > 0, (ii)q < 0, |A2| > 3 : p(0) < −1 and q > 0
2)Indeterminate 2)Indeterminate
Current-looking Rule
The characteristic equation of (1.30) is
p2(µ) = −µ3 +
(
1 +
1
β
+ βR¯1 +
βf¯ ′′u¯mm
s
)
µ2
−
[
βR¯1
(
1 +
1
β
+
βf¯ ′′u¯mm
s
+
βf¯ ′′u¯cm
p¯is
)
+
f¯ ′′u¯cm
s
(
p¯i − β
p¯i
+
1
β
)]
µ
+ βR¯1
(
1
β
+
f¯ ′′u¯cm
s
)
. (1.43)
The relation between the equilibrium determinacy and the characteristic equation
is shown by Table 1.4. Expressing (1.43) as p(µ) = −µ3−A2µ2−A1µ−A0, we find
that determinacy holds if one of the following conditions is satisfied:
1. p(1) > 0 and p(−1) < 0
2. p(1) < 0, p(−1) > 0 and q ≡ (A0)2 − A0A2 + A1 − 1 > 0
3. p(1) < 0, p(−1) > 0, q < 0 and |A2| > 3.
We will check each condition. Note that in this system p2(1) = −βu¯cf¯
′′S¯m
s
(βR¯1−1),
and therefore p2(1) < 0 (resp. p2(1) > 0) if the monetary policy is active (resp.
passive). The other key values are:
p2(−1) =
[
2
(
1 +
1
β
)
+
f¯ ′′u¯cm
s
(
1 +
β
p¯i
)
+
βf¯ ′′u¯mm
s
]
(βR¯1 + 1)− 2βf¯
′′u¯cm
p¯is
,
p2(0) = βR¯1
(
1
β
+
f¯ ′′u¯cm
s
)
,
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q =
[
βR¯1
(
1
β
+
f¯ ′′u¯cm
s
)]2
− βR¯1
(
1
β
+
f¯ ′′u¯cm
s
)(
1 +
1
β
+ βR1 +
βf¯ ′′u¯mm
s
)
+
[
βR¯1
(
1 +
1
β
+
βf¯ ′′u¯mm
s
+
βf¯ ′′u¯cm
p¯is
)
+
f¯ ′′u¯cm
s
(
p¯i − β
p¯i
)
+
1
β
]
− 1, and
|A2| =
∣∣∣∣1 + 1β + βR¯1 + βf¯ ′′u¯mms
∣∣∣∣.
Appendix 1.B: Manipulation of the CWID Timing
Model
Forward-looking Rule
From (1.21), (1.24), (1.37) and (1.38) with R¯1 = 0 and R¯2 > 0, the reduced dynamic
system is thus given by
[
kˆt+1
cˆt+1
]
=

1
β
−1
−
u¯cf¯
′′R¯S¯m + u¯cmf¯ ′′X2
(
1
β
− 1
)
sR¯− βu¯cmf¯ ′′X2
βu¯cf¯
′′R¯S¯m + u¯cmf¯ ′′X2
sR¯− βu¯cmf¯ ′′X2
+ 1

[
kˆt
cˆt
]
,
(1.44)
where X2 =
βR¯2
βR¯2 − 1. The characteristic equation is
p3(µ) = µ
2 −
(
1 +
1
β
+
βu¯cf¯
′′R¯S¯m + u¯cmf¯ ′′X2
sR¯− βu¯cmf¯ ′′X2
)
µ
+
1
β
(
βu¯cf¯
′′R¯S¯m + u¯cmf¯ ′′X2
sR¯− βu¯cmf¯ ′′X2
)
−
u¯cf¯
′′R¯S¯m + u¯cmf¯ ′′X2
(
1
β
− 1
)
sR¯− βu¯cmf¯ ′′X2
. (1.45)
The system (1.44) is similar to (1.27) in the case of CIA timing model, so that
Table 1.3 presents the relation between the equilibrium determinacy and the charac-
teristic equation again. It can be easily checked that two roots are real. We obtain
the following values from the polynomial equation (1.45) :
p3(1) = −βu¯cf¯
′′R¯S¯m + u¯cmf¯ ′′X2
sR¯− βu¯cmf¯ ′′X2
;
p3(−1) = 2
(
1 +
1
β
+
u¯cmf¯
′′X2
sR¯− βu¯cmf¯ ′′X2
)
+
βu¯cf¯
′′R¯S¯m
sR¯− βu¯cmf¯ ′′X2
;
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p3(0) =
1
β
+
u¯cmf¯
′′X2
sR¯− βu¯cmf¯ ′′X2
.
In contrast to the CIA timing with the forward-looking rule, we cannot reject the
possibility of indeterminacy. From the example as above, Figure 1.3 and Proposition
1.3 show the result in this case.
Current-looking Rule
From (1.21), (1.24), (1.37) and (1.38) with R¯1 > 0 and R¯2 = 0, we obtain
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kˆt+1cˆt+1
pˆit+1
 = [e1 e2 e3]
kˆtcˆt
pˆit
 . (1.46)
The characteristic equation is
p4(µ) = −µ3 +
(
1 +
1
β
+ βR¯1 − f¯
′′u¯cm[β(R¯− 1) + β2R¯1]− βf¯ ′′R¯u¯mm
R¯s
)
µ2
−
[
1
β
+ βR¯1
(
1 +
1
β
+
βf¯ ′′
s
(u¯mm − u¯cm)
)]
µ+ R¯1. (1.47)
The system (1.46) is analogous to (1.30) in the case of CIA with current-looking
rule so that Table 1.4 shows the relation between the equilibrium determinacy and
the characteristic equation. p4(1) = −βu¯cf¯
′′S¯m
s
(βR¯1 − 1) < 0(resp. > 0) if the
monetary policy is active (resp. passive). Since p4(0) = R¯1 > 0, there are no or
two eigenvalues which are negative, so that there is indeterminacy if p4(1) < 0 and
p4(−1) < 0, where p4(−1) = − f¯
′′u¯cm[βR¯1(β(R¯ + 1)) + β(R¯− 1)]
R¯s
+(1+βR¯1)
[
2
(
1+
1
β
)
+
βf¯ ′′u¯mm
s
]
. Again, we check the conditions for determinacy of such a system
10 e1≡

1
β
f¯ ′′u¯cm[(R¯− 1) + βR¯1]− f¯ ′′R¯u¯mm
R¯s
−p¯if¯ ′′
, e2≡

−1
f¯ ′′u¯cm[β(R¯− 1) + β2R¯1]− βf¯ ′′R¯u¯mm
R¯s
+ 1
p¯if¯ ′′β
,
and e3≡

0
− u¯cmR¯1
R¯2s
(βR¯1 − 1)
βR¯1
.
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described in Appendix 1.A.
q =
(
1−β+β
2f¯ ′′u¯cm
R¯s
)
(R¯1)
2+
(
− 1
β
+β+
βf¯ ′′
s
[(
1−β− 1
R¯
)
u¯cm−(1−β)u¯mm
])
R¯1
+
1
β
− 1
|A2| =
∣∣∣∣1 + 1β + βR¯1 − f¯ ′′u¯cm[β2R¯1 + β(R¯− 1)]− βf¯ ′′R¯u¯mmR¯s
∣∣∣∣
The result based on the example as above is shown in Figure 1.4 and Proposition
1.4.
Appendix 1.C: The Euler Equation for a Specified
Model
In the example (1.40)-(1.42), the Euler equation in the CIA timing is
β
[
Aγ
k1−γt+1
+ 1− δ
]
=
(
ct+1
ct
)1−ρ1(1−σ)( mt
mt−1
)−ρ2(1−σ)
=
(
ct+1
ct
)1−(ρ1+ρ2)(1−σ)((R(pit+j)− 1)/pit+1
(R(pit+j−1)− 1)/pit
)ρ2(1−σ)
.
Similarly, the Euler equation under the CWID timing is given by
β
[
Aγ
k1−γt+1
+ 1− δ
]
=
(
ct+1
ct
)1−ρ1(1−σ)(mt+1
mt
)−ρ2(1−σ)
=
(
ct+1
ct
)1−(ρ1+ρ2)(1−σ)((R(pit+j+1)− 1)/R(pit+j+1)
(R(pit+j)− 1)/R(pit+j)
)ρ2(1−σ)
.
When (ρ1 + ρ2)(1 − σ) > 1, the utility displays increasing returns-to-scale in con-
sumption and real money balances. It may effect equilibrium determinacy. This
is pointed out by Guo and Harrison (2008), in which the utility function involves
government expenditure instead of real money balances. They conclude that inde-
terminacy holds if and only if (ρ1 + ρ2)(1 − σ) > 1. We suppose that ρ1 and ρ2
are free parameters to consider this argument. In this example, we can express the
conditions for equilibrium determinacy, such as q, |A2|, and so on, as the functions of
ρ2(1−σ) and α. We can eliminate ρ1 in the process of calculation. If ρ1(1−σ) < 1
and ρ2(1−σ) < 1, that is, 1−σ < min
{
1
ρ1
,
1
ρ2
}
, then the utility function satisfies
strict concavity.
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When we see the figures, we must be careful of the fact that the higher ρ2
is, the broader the plausible range of ρ2(1 − σ) is. For example, in Figure 1.1,
which draws the result of the CIA timing with forward-looking rule, if α = 1.05,
non-stationary happens when 0.92 < ρ2(1 − σ) < 1. Assuming ρ1 = 0.98 and
ρ2 = 0.02, ρ2(1 − σ) < min
{
ρ2
ρ1
, 1
}
= 0.021, must be satisfied for concavity of
utility function, so that non-stationary does not happen under α = 1.05. Now, we
suppose that only ρ2 is changed, ρ2 = 0.92. The area for concave utility function
becomes ρ2(1− σ) < 0.939, and therefore non-stationary under α = 1.05 happens
if 0.92 < ρ2(1 − σ) < 0.939. However, this instance and Figure 1.1-1.4 shows that
whether (ρ1 + ρ2)(1− σ) is higher than 1 or not is little important for equilibrium
determinacy unless we consider the extreme values of ρ1, ρ2, and 1 − σ. It is
contrast to Guo and Harrison (2008).
In Guo and Harrison (2008), the Euler equation is rewritten as 11
β
[
Aγ
k1−γt+1
+ 1− δ
]
=
(
ct+1
ct
)1−ρ1(1−σ)(gt+1
gt
)−ρ2(1−σ)
=
(
ct+1
ct
)1−(ρ1+ρ2)(1−σ)
,
since the marginal utility of government spending is equal to the one of consumption
and thus gt =
ρ2
ρ1
ct. Their Euler equation is the relation between capital and
consumption. Therefore, increasing returns-to-scale of the utility directly effects
equilibrium determinacy in their model. On the other hand, the effect of increasing
returns-to-scale of the utility for equilibrium determinacy is indefinite because our
Euler equation includes the inflation rate, i.e., the opportunity cost of holding money.
11Tax is included in their model. However, this is not critical for the Euler equation. We describe
their Euler equation such that we can compare with that of our model.
Chapter 2
Generalized Taylor Rule and
Endogenous Growth I: A
Continuous-Time Analysis
2.1 Introduction
Many authors have explored whether the interest-rate control rule based on Tay-
lor’s (1993) idea contributes to reducing equilibrium indeterminacy which generates
expectations-driven economic fluctuations. In the literature, it has been well known
that an economy following Taylor’s rule may easily produce multiple equilibria, if
the model economy does not consider capital accumulation. For example, Benhabib
et. al. (2001b) reveal that an active interest-rate control under which the nomi-
nal interest rate is adjusted more than one-for-one with the rate of inflation, the
competitive equilibrium is determinate. Conversely, under a passive interest-rate
feedback rule which controls the nominal interest rate less than one-for-one with
inflation, the competitive equilibrium tends to be indeterminate. At the same time,
Benhabib et. al. (2001a) demonstrate that those results would be reversed if the
production function contains the stock of real money balances as an input.
In contrast to the models without capital, Meng and Yip (2004) confirm that
the possibility of equilibrium indeterminacy under the Taylor rule is significantly
reduced, if the economy allows capital accumulation.1 Technically speaking, intro-
1Meng and Yip (2004) use a neoclassical monetary growth model based on the money-in-the-
utility function formulation.Li and Yip (2004), on the other hand, show that if a cash-in-advance
constraint applies to both investment and consumption so that money is not superneutral in the
24
25
ducing capital adds a non-jumpable state variable to the model, which generally
contributes to eliminating multiple converging paths. Meng and Yip (2004) also
show that such a conclusion still holds, even if monetary authority changes the
nominal interest rate by observing the level of real income as well as inflation.2
This chapter reconsiders the issue of equilibrium determinacy under interest-rate
control rules in the context of a simple growth model. We use a standard money-
in-the-utility function model with an AK technology and exogenous labor supply.
In this setting, regardless of interest-rate control rules, money is superneutral on
the balanced-growth path and the long-term growth rate of income is uniquely de-
termined by the technology and preference parameters alone. In addition, if the
monetary authority adjusts the nominal interest rate by observing the rate of in-
flation alone, such a monetary policy only affects the steady-state rate of inflation,
and hence behaviors of consumption and capital will not respond to the monetary
authority’s behavior. However, if the monetary authority adopts Taylor’s (1993)
original proposal and controls nominal interest in response not only to inflation
but also to the growth rate of income, then the balanced-growth path may ex-
hibit indeterminacy: there is a continuum of equilibrium paths converging to the
balanced-growth equilibrium. In this case, although the balanced-growth path sat-
isfies superneutrality of money, the transition process is affected by the monetary
policy. We reveal that, in addition to activeness of interest-rate control, the intertem-
poral substitutability in felicity also plays a key role for the presence of equilibrium
indeterminacy.3
steady state, the interest-rate control rule may generate indeterminacy. See also Dupor (2001).
2Indeterminacy may emerge if the model introduces labor-leisure choice. As pointed out by
Meng and Yip (2004), this possibility, however, requires that labor supply curve has a positive
slope.
3When the nominal interest rate responds to inflation alone in an AK growth model, interme-
diacy would emerge either if labor supply is endogenous or if a cash-in- advance constraint applies
to investment as well: see Mino and Itaya (2004 and 2007) and Suen and Yip (2005). In those
cases, money is not superneutral on the balanced- growth path, which is different from our present
formulation where monetary policy cannot affect long-term economic growth.
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2.2 The Model
We employ a standard money-in-the-utility-function modelling with an AK technol-
ogy. The representative household maximizes a discounted sum of utilities
U =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtu (c,m) dt, ρ > 0
subject to the flow budget and wealth constraints:
a˙ = ra− c−Rm,
a = k +m,
where c is consumption, m real money balances, k capital stock, a total wealth,
r real interest rate and R denotes nominal interest rate. The initial holding of a
is exogenously given. Here, we specify the instantaneous utility function in the
following manner:
u (c,m) =
(cγm1−γ)1−σ
1− σ , 0 < γ < 1, σ > 0, σ 6= 1.
Denoting the shadow value of a as q, we find that the optimization conditions
include the following:
(1− γ) c
γm
= R, (2.1)
γcγ(1−σ)−1m(1−σ)(1−γ) = q, (2.2)
q˙ = q (ρ− r) , (2.3)
together with the transversality condition: limt→∞ e−ρtaq = 0. Equation (2.1) means
that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and real money balances
equal the nominal interest rate.
We assume that the production function is specified as
y = Ak, (2.4)
where y denotes aggregate output. The commodity market is assumed to be com-
petitive so that the real interest rate is determined by
r = A. (2.5)
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We ignore capital depreciation and thus the market equilibrium condition for com-
modity is y = k˙ + c, which yields
k˙
k
= A− z, (2.6)
where z = c/k.
Following Taylor (1993), we assume that the monetary authority adjusts the
nominal interest rate by observing the level of real income as well as the rate of
inflation. Since we deal with a growing economy in which real income continues
expanding, we consider that the monetary authority changes the nominal interest
rate in response not to the level of income but to the growth rate of income.4 The
monetary policy rule is thus specified as
R = φ (pi) + η (g) . φ′ > 0, η′ > 0, (2.7)
where g denotes the growth rate of income. From (4.28) and (2.6) , g is given by
g =
y˙
y
=
k˙
k
= A− z.
In view of the Fisher condition, the relation and nominal and real interest rates
is described by
r + pi = R. (2.8)
From (2.7) we obtain:
A+ pi = φ (pi) + η (A− z) , (2.9)
which yields
dpi
dz
=
η′ (A− z)
φ′ (pi)− 1 .
As a result, the relation between pi and z is expressed as
pi = pi (z) , (2.10)
where
sign pi′ (z) = sign [φ′ (pi)− 1] .
Namely, the equilibrium rate of inflation is positively (resp. negatively) related to
the consumption-capital ratio, z, if the monetary authority actively (resp. passively)
responds to a change in the rate of inflation.
4In our notation, Taylor’s principle is expressed as R = 1.5 (pi − pi∗)+0.5y (or R = 1.5 (pi − pi∗)+
1.0y), where pi∗ denotes the target rate of inflation.
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2.3 Policy Rules and Aggregate Stability
To derive a complete dynamic system, first note that from (2.1), (2.8) and (2.9) we
obtain
c
m
=
γ
1− γ [A+ pi (z)].
Taking the time derivatives of the both sides of the above, we obtain
c˙
c
− m˙
m
=
pi′ (z) z˙
A+ pi (z)
. (2.11)
Using (2.2) and (2.3) , we derive:
[γ (1− σ)− 1] c˙
c
+ (1− σ) (1− γ) m˙
m
= ρ− A. (2.12)
Eliminating m˙/m from (2.11) and (2.12) yields
c˙
c
=
1
σ
(A− ρ)−
(
1
σ
− 1
)
(1− γ) pi
′ (z) z˙
A+ pi (z)
. (2.13)
Since it holds that z˙/z = c˙/c − k˙/k, equations (2.6) and (2.13) present the
following:
z˙
z
=
1
σ
(A− ρ)−
(
1
σ
− 1
)
(1− γ) pi
′ (z) z˙
A+ pi (z)
− A+ z.
The above is rewritten as
z˙
z
=
1
σ
(A− ρ)− A+ z
Γ (z)
, (2.14)
where
Γ (z) = 1 +
(
1
σ
− 1
)
(1− γ) pi
′ (z) z
A+ pi (z)
.
Equation (2.14) gives a complete dynamic equation that summarizes the dynamic
behavior of our economy.
It is easy to see that either if 0 < σ < 1 and pi′ (z) > 0 or if σ > 1 and pi′ (z) < 0,
then
Γ (z) > 0,
so that a unique balanced-growth path in which z is determined by
1
σ
(A− ρ)− A+ z∗ = 0 (2.15)
is unstable. This means that the economy always stays on the balanced-growth path,
which implies that the economy exhibits global determinacy. Notice that both active
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control (φ′ > 1 so that pi′ (z) is positive) and passive control (φ′ < 1 so that pi′ (z) is
negative) may yield determinacy depending on the magnitude of σ.
In contrast, either if σ > 1 and pi′ (z) > 0 or if σ < 1 and pi′ (z) < 0, then it is
possible to hold Γ (z) < 0 and thus d (z˙/z) /dz < 0 on the balanced-growth path.
In this case, we see that the balanced-growth path is stable and it exhibits local
indeterminacy.
To sum up, we have shown:
Proposition 2.1 Suppose that the interest rate control rule is given by (2.7) . Then
either if φ′ (pi) > 0 and 0 < σ < 1 or if φ′ (pi) < 1 and σ > 1, the balanced-growth
path satisfies local determinacy.
Proposition 2.2 The necessary and sufficient condition for local indeterminacy is:
1 +
(
1
σ
− 1
)
η′ (A− z) (1− γ) z
[φ′ (pi)− 1][A+ pi (z)] < 0, (2.16)
where z∗ and pi∗ are their steady-state values.5
Intuitive implication of the above results is as follows. Suppose that the economy
is initially in the balanced-growth equilibrium where capital, consumption and real
money balances grow at a common rate of g∗ = (1/σ) (A− ρ) . Suppose further that,
due to a change of sunspot-driven expectations, households anticipate a rise in the
rate of capital accumulation and that the consumption-capital ratio, z, will decline.
Then, for example, if 0 < σ < 1 and φ′ > 1, equation (2.13) indicates that the
growth rate of consumption will decrease.6 This means that consumption growth
is insufficient to meet the output expansion caused by the expected acceleration of
capital formation. Hence, the initial expectations are not self fulfilled, implying that
the balanced-growth path itself is a unique competitive equilibrium and the econ-
omy has no transition process. Conversely, if (2.16) is satisfied, (2.13) indicates that
consumption growth is enhanced. Therefore, there would be enough consumption
demand for the expected increase in production, so that the initial expectations are
self-fulfilled. If this is the case, there exists a infinite number of converting trajec-
tories at least around the balanced-growth equilibrium: the economy can be out
5Global indeterminacy emerges if (2.16) is satisfied for all z ∈ (0, A) , which imposes further
restrictions on φ (pi) and η (g) functions.
6In this situation the substitution effect of a change in the nominal interest rate dominates the
income effect, which depresses growth of consumption demand.
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of the balanced-growth equilibrium and monetary disturbances affect the dynamic
behavior of the economy.
To be more concrete, let us specify the policy-rule function in such a way that
R = pi∗
( pi
pi∗
)φ
+ A
(
g
g∗
)η
, φ > 0, η > 0, (2.17)
where pi∗ is the target rate of inflation and g∗ denotes the balanced-growth rate
determined by g∗ = (1/σ) (A− ρ) . In this specification, the target rate of inflation
is set by the monetary authority and (2.8) is satisfied on the balanced-growth path
where g = g∗ and pi = pi∗. Given this specification, equation (2.9) becomes
A+ pi = pi∗
( pi
pi∗
)φ
+ A
(
A− z
A− z∗
)η
,
which yields
dpi
dz
=
Aη
A−z∗
(
A−z
A−z∗
)η−1
φ
(
pi
pi∗
)φ−1 − 1 .
When we evaluate the above on the balanced growth path where z = z∗ and pi = pi∗,
we obtain
dpi
dz
∣∣∣∣
z=z∗
≡ pi′ (z∗) = 1
φ− 1
[
σAη
A− ρ
]
.
Using the above, we find that
Γ (z∗) = 1 +
(
1
σ
− 1
)
(1− γ) pi
′ (z∗) z∗
A+ pi (z∗)
= 1 +
(1− σ) (1− γ)Aη
σ(A+ pi∗) (φ− 1) (A− ρ)
[
A− 1
σ
(A− ρ)
]
. (2.18)
Therefore, Γ (z∗) is strictly negative, if and only if
η(1− σ)
φ− 1 < −
σ(A+ pi∗) (A− ρ)
A (1− γ) [A− 1
σ
(A− ρ)] (< 0) (2.19)
The necessary conditions to hold this inequality are (i) σ < 1 and φ < 1 or (ii)
σ > 1 and φ > 1. If one of these conditions are met, the possibility of indeterminacy
increases as η has a larger value, that is, the monetary authority is more sensitive to
a divergence between the actual growth rate and the long-run target rate of income
expansion.
As an numerical example, let us set:
A = 0.07, ρ = 0.04, γ = 0.7, pi∗ = 0.02.
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Then the relation between φ, σ and η that satisfies Γ (z∗) = 0 in (2.18) is given by
φ = 1 +
7.77 (σ − 1) [0.07 (σ − 1) + 0.04]
σ2
η. (2.20)
Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 2.1 depict the graphs between φ and η under given
levels of σ. Figures 2.1 (a) assumes that σ = 2.0 so that the balanced growth rate
is g∗ = (1/σ) (A− ρ) = 0.015, while Figure (b) sets σ = 0.5 and thus g∗ = 0.06. As
these figures demonstrate, in both cases the region of the value of φ under which
indeterminacy emerges is enhanced as η increases. Figure 2.2 shows the graph of
(2.20) with a given η. Since in this figure z∗ has a negative value for 0 < σ < 0.428,
we focus on the region where σ > 0.428. Again, the graph means that an increase
in η enhances the region of indeterminacy in the (φ, σ) space.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we re-examine whether the interest-rate feedback rule according to
Taylor (1993) eliminates expectations-driven fluctuations in an endogenously grow-
ing economy. To focus on the role of monetary policy rule, we have used an AK
model with fixed labor supply in which money is superneutral on the balanced-
growth path. Even in such a simple setting, the interest-control rule may generate
indeterminacy of equilibrium, if the monetary authority adjusts the nominal interest
rate in response to the growth rate of income as well as to the rate of inflation. It
is shown that the key elements for indeterminacy conditions are the sensitivity of
nominal interest to inflation and the intertemporal rate of substitution in felicity.
For expositional simplicity, this chapter examines the issue in a continuous-time
model. As is well known, in discrete-time settings, both the timing of money holding
and the time perspective of the monetary authority (for example, forward-looking
vs. current-looking rules) are also relevant for determinacy of equilibrium.7 Exam-
ining the role of generalized Taylor rule in alternative formulations of discrete-time
monetary growth models deserves further investigation. We approach this problem
in the next chapter.
7Chapter 1 explores equilibrium determinacy in a discrete-time neoclassical growth model under
alterative formulations of money holding and interest-rate feedback rule.
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Figure 2.1: (2.20) given σ
Figure 2.2: (2.20) given η
Chapter 3
Generalized Taylor Rule and
Endogenous Growth II: A
Discrete-Time Analysis
In Chapter 2, we use an AK growth model with a generalized Taylor rule to demon-
strate that equilibrium indeterminacy may emerge more easily than in the exogenous
growth models. The discrete-time setting in this chapter can provide us with a richer
set of results concerning equilibrium determinacy.
3.1 Introduction
Taylor (1993) proposes a monetary policy rule for economic stabilization under which
the central bank adjusts the nominal interest rate in response to real income as well
as to the rate of inflation. However, the existing theoretical studies on the interest
control rules often assume that the interest rate responds to inflation alone 1. The
purpose of this chapter is to explore the efficacy of the original Taylor rule in the
context of a model of endogenous growth. We introduce money into the basic AK
growth model via the money-in-the-utility-function formulation. In such a simple
environment, money is superneutral on the balanced growth path. In our setting,
however, money is not superneutral in the transition process and, hence, the selection
of monetary policy rule may have relevant effects on determinacy of equilibrium path
leading to the balanced-growth equilibrium.
1In models of endowment economy as in Leeper (1991) or Benhabib et. al. (2001a), real income
cannot be used as an index of monetary policy.
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We construct our model in a discrete-time setting, which enables us to consider
alternative timings of households’ money holdings and of the inflation rate used for
controlling nominal interest rate. As for money holding of the household, we can
distinguish the cash-in-advance (CIA) timing from the cash-when-I’m-done (CWID)
timing. The CIA (resp. CWID) timing means that real money balances in the
utility function is the stock of money the household holds before entering (resp.
after leaving) the final goods market 2. Moreover, in our discrete-time model we
find that the main results are also sensitive to the assumption whether the central
bank’s control rule is current-looking or forward-looking. Therefore, in a discrete-
time modelling, we can analyze four patterns of formulations: (i) CWID timing
with a forward-looking rule, (ii) CIA timing with a forward-looking rule, (iii) CWID
timing with a current-looking rule, and (iv) CIA timing with a current-looking rule.
We obtain two main findings. First, the response of the interest rate to the
growth rate of income may play a significant role for equilibrium determinacy. In
fact, if the monetary authority controls interest rate in response to inflation alone,
we obtain the standard results: equilibrium determinacy holds under the forward-
looking and active current-looking monetary rule, while the passive current-looking
interest-control rule generates equilibrium indeterminacy. If the interest rate re-
sponds to the growth rate of income as well, the possibility of emergence of equi-
librium indeterminacy may be enhanced. Second, the efficacy of the generalized
Taylor rule for macroeconomic stability depends upon the timings of money holding
of the households. We can easily show that the timing of households’ money does
not affect equilibrium determinacy in an AK growth economy when the central bank
does not responds to the rate of inflation alone. The discrete-time analysis in an
AK model becomes significant due to the generalization of the interest-rate control.
These findings demonstrate that the monetary authority should carefully select a
specific interest rate control rule in order to attain stability even if the economic
environment is simple enough to hold superneutrality of money in the long run.
Several studies are closely related to this chapter. As for the equilibrium deter-
minacy in monetary growth model with an AK technology, Suen and Yip (2005)
and Chen and Guo (2008a) introduce money into the model in the form of cash-in-
advance (CIA) constraint. Those authors show that the balanced-growth path may
2The discrete-time monetary models usually assume the CWID timing of the money holdings.
However, as Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) claim, it is difficult to justify CWID timing on theoretical
grounds, because this assumption means that the money held at the beginning of t + 1 reduces
transaction costs in period t.
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be indeterminate under a constant money growth rule if the CIA constraint applies
not only to consumption but also to investment so that money is not superneutral
on the balanced growth path 3. Indeterminacy is generated by this form of the CIA
constraint rather than by monetary policy rule.
Li and Yip (2004) and Meng and Yip (2004) investigate the effect of Taylor-type
interest rate control in the neoclassical growth (i.e. exogenous growth) models. The
main message of these studies is that in the neoclassical growth models equilibrium is
mostly determinate regardless of the form of interest rate control rules. In contrast,
the sticky-price models with capital utilize exogenous growth settings and conclude
that forward-looking interest rate controls to generate equilibrium indeterminacy:
see, for example, Dupor (2001) and Huang and Meng (2007). In this chapter, using a
discrete-time endogenous growth model, we demonstrate that the stabilization effect
of interest-rate rules with capital formation shown by the existing literature critically
depends on their assumption under which continuing growth is not sustained in the
long-run equilibrium.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Households
The economy consists of a continuum of identical households with a unit mass. The
agent maximizes her lifetime utility
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct,mt−J), 0 < β < 1, J = 0, 1 (3.1)
subject to the flow budget constraint such that
kt+1 − (1− δ)kt + ct +mt + bt + τt = yt + mt−1
pit
+
Rt−1bt−1
pit
, 0 < δ < 1. (3.2)
Each variable means the following: β=time discounting rate; δ=capital depreciation
rate; ct =real consumption; mt−J=real money balances at the beginning of period
t − J + 1; kt=(per capita) stock of capital; bt=real stock of bonds at the end of
period; τt=lump-sum tax; yt=real income; pit ≡ Pt/Pt−1=gross rate of inflation;
3Chen and Guo (2008a) generalize Suen and Yip (2005) in a way that the CIA constraint applies
to consumption and to a certain fraction of gross investment.
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Pt=nominal price level; Rt−1=gross nominal interest rate in period t − 1. In this
chapter, we specify the utility function as follows:
u(ct,mt−J) =
(cρ1t m
ρ2
t−J)
1−σ
1− σ , ρ1 + ρ2 = 1, σ > 0,
where σ is the inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution 4. This felicity
function satisfies sign(ucm) = sign(1 − σ), so that consumption and real money
balances are Edgeworth complements if 0 < σ < 1, while they are Edgeworth
substitutes if σ > 1. We define J = 1 as cash-in-advance (CIA) timing, and J = 0
as cash-when-I’m-done (CWID) timing.
We assume that the production function of the representative firm is given by a
simple AK technology, yt = Akt. Thus the competitive rate of return on capital is
fixed at A.
To derive the optimality conditions for the household’s consumption plan, set up
the following Lagrangian function:
L ≡
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
u(ct,mt−J)+λt
[
−kt+1+(1−δ)kt−ct−mt−bt−τt+Akt+mt−1
pit
+
Rt−1bt−1
pit
]}
.
The first-order conditions for the household’s optimization problem are:
λt = uc(ct,mt−J) = (c
ρ1
t m
ρ2
t−J)
(1−σ)ρ1
ct
; (3.3)
um(ct,mt) = (c
ρ1
t m
ρ2
t )
(1−σ) ρ2
mt
= λt − βλt+1
pit+1
when J = 0; (3.4)
um(ct+1,mt) = (c
ρ1
t+1m
ρ2
t )
(1−σ) ρ2
mt
=
λt
β
− λt+1
pit+1
when J = 1; (3.5)
λt−1 = βλt(A+ 1− δ); (3.6)
λt =
βλt+1Rt
pit+1
; (3.7)
lim
t→∞
βt+1λt+1kt+1 = 0; (3.8)
lim
t→∞
βtλtmt = 0; (3.9)
lim
t→∞
βtλtbt = 0. (3.10)
4This instantaneous utility function satisfies uc > 0, um > 0, ucc < 0, umm < 0, uccum −
ucmuc < 0, and ummuc−ucmum < 0. That is, the utility function is strictly increasing and strictly
concave in c and m, and consumption c and real money balances m are both normal goods.
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Equations (3.8)-(3.10) are the transversality conditions.
From (3.6) and (3.7), we obtain the following Fisher equation:
Rt
pit+1
= A+ 1− δ. (3.11)
This represents the non-arbitrage condition, under which the real interest rate of
bond is equal to the net real rate of return on capital. Moreover, we acquire the
following equations showing that the marginal rate of substitution between consump-
tion and real money holdings is equal to the opportunity cost of holding money:
um(ct,mt)
uc(ct,mt)
=
ρ2
ρ1
ct
mt
=
1
A+ 1− δ
Rt − 1
pit+1
when J = 0; (3.12)
um(ct+1,mt)
uc(ct+1,mt)
=
ρ2
ρ1
ct+1
mt
=
Rt − 1
pit+1
when J = 1. (3.13)
3.2.2 Capital Formation
The government budget constraint is
mt + bt + τt =
mt−1
pit
+
Rt−1bt−1
pit
. (3.14)
From (3.2), (3.14), and the production function yt = Akt , we obtain the goods-
market equilibrium condition:
kt+1 = Akt + (1− δ)kt − ct. (3.15)
Denoting zt ≡ ct
kt
, we can rewrite the condition (3.15) as
kt+1
kt
= A+ 1− δ − zt. (3.16)
3.2.3 Policy Rules
We consider the Taylor-type monetary policy rule under which the central bank
controls the nominal interest rate in response to the growth rate of income as well
as to the rate of either current or expected inflation. Formally, we assume that
Rt = R(pit+i, gt+i),
∂Rt
∂pit+i
≥ 0, ∂Rt
∂gt+i
≥ 0, i = 0 or 1, (3.17)
where gt+i ≡ yt+1+i
yt+i
=
kt+1+i
kt+i
= A+1−δ−zt+i is the gross rate of real income growth.
If i = 0 (resp. i = 1), the interest rate rule is said to be current-looking (resp.
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forward-looking), in which monetary authority uses the current (resp. expected)
values of economic variables as indices to stabilize economy. Since we deal with
a growing economy in which real income continues expanding, our formulation of
interest-rate control rule is a natural extension of Taylor’s (1993) original proposal.
For analytical simplicity, we specify (3.17) as
Rt = pi
∗
(
pit+i
pi∗
)φ
(A+ 1− δ)
(
gt+i
g∗
)η
, φ ≥ 0, φ 6= 1, η ≥ 0. (3.18)
In the above, x∗ is the balanced-growth value of a variable xt, and pi∗ is the target
rate of inflation. If φ > 1, the nominal interest rate rises more than one for one
in response to a change in the rate of inflation. Then, the interest control rule is
said to be active as to inflation. Conversely, the rule (4.12) with φ < 1 is defined as
passive monetary policy.
From (3.11), (3.18) and gt = 1 + A− δ − zt, the equilibrium rate of inflation is
pit+1 = piF (zt+1) = pi
∗
(
1 + A− δ − zt+1
1 + A− δ − z∗
)− η
φ−1
for i = 1,
pit+1 = piC(pit, zt) = (pi
∗)−(φ−1)(pit)φ
(
1 + A− δ − zt
1 + A− δ − z∗
)η
for i = 0,
where
sign[piF
′(zt+1)] = sign
[
η
φ− 1
]
,
∂piC(pit, zt)
∂pit
> 0, sign
[
∂piC(pit, zt)/pit
∂pit
]
= sign(φ− 1), and
sign
[
∂piC(pit, zt)
∂zt
]
= sign
[
∂piC(pit, zt)/pit
∂zt
]
= −sign(η).
Let us consider these properties to understand the role of the interest-rate control
in the AK growth economy. When the growth rate of income in which monetary
policy rule targets increases, the central bank raises the nominal interest rate to
stabilize economy. Since the net real rate of return on capital is constant due to the
assumption of AK technology, the real interest rate also should be kept constant
by controlling the rate of inflation to satisfy non-arbitrage condition. This process
added by a generalization of Taylor rule is important for macroeconomic stability
as shown in the following sections. Due to the absence of the process, the timing
of money in the felicity does not have an impact on equilibrium determinacy in the
AK model with Taylor rule which responds only to the rate of inflation.
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If monetary policy is forward-looking and active (resp. passive) , this is achieved
by lowering (resp. increasing) the rate of inflation. Under the active (resp. passive)
current-looking interest-rate control, the growth rate of inflation is usually positive
(resp. negative) when the rate of inflation today rises. However, the nominal interest
rate becomes much higher for a positive response to the growth rate of income so
that the growth rate of inflation may be positive, even if the interest control rule is
passive.
Using the functions of the inflation rate, we obtain the following:
Rt − 1
pit+1
= A+ 1− δ − 1
piF (zt+1)
= oF (zt+1) for i = 1, (3.19)
Rt − 1
pit+1
= A+ 1− δ − 1
piC(pit, zt)
= oC(pit, zt) for i = 0, (3.20)
where
oF
′(zt+1) =
piF
′(zt+1)
[piF (zt+1)]2
: sign[oF
′(zt+1)] = sign
[
η
φ− 1
]
,
∂oC(pit, zt)
∂pit
=
∂piC(pit, zt)
∂pit
1
[piC(pit, zt)]2
> 0,
∂oC(pit, zt)
∂zt
=
∂piC(pit, zt)
∂zt
1
[piC(pit, zt)]2
< 0.
Hence, the opportunity cost of holding money is positively related to the equilibrium
rate of inflation 5.
3.3 Forward-looking Rule
3.3.1 CWID Timing
When we assume CWID timing of money holding and forward-looking monetary
policy rule, a complete dynamic equation is given by the following :
zt+1 = [θ
∗θFW (zt+2, zt+1)− A+ δ + zt]zt, (3.21)
5We consider the special case in which the nominal interest rate is pegged (φ = η = 0). From
the non-arbitrage condition (3.11), the rate of inflation is also fixed in the case of AK technology.
Therefore, the dynamics of zt is the same as in the standard AK model regardless of the timing of
money in the utility and, hence, equilibrium determinacy around the balanced-growth path always
holds.
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η
(1a)0 < σ < 1
1
0
determinacy indeterminacy
(1b)1 < σ
φ
η
1
0
Figure 3.1: The CWID timing with forward-looking rule
where θ∗ ≡ {β(1+A−δ)} 1σ = 1+A−δ−z∗ and θFW (zt+2, zt+1) =
(
oF (zt+2)
oF (zt+1)
)− 1−σ
σ
ρ2
.
In the following, we focus on equilibrium determinacy around the balanced-growth
path with a positive growth rate, assuming that 0 < z∗ < A − δ. We linearize a
dynamic system in each case 6. We summarize the result in the following proposition
and Figure 3.1.
Proposition 3.1 Consider the economy with the CWID timing under the forward-
looking interest rate rule. Then, regardless of the sign of (1− σ), equilibrium inde-
terminacy tends to hold if
η
|φ− 1| is high.
6A derivation of the dynamics of zt and the linearized system around the balanced-growth in
each case are shown in Appendix 3.A. This is also the basis for drawing Figures 3.1-3.4.
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Figure 3.2: The CIA timing with forward-looking rule
3.3.2 CIA Timing
In the case of CIA timing, we can derive a complete dynamic system as a single
equation such that
zt+1 = [θ
∗θFI(zt+1, zt)− A+ δ + zt]zt, (3.22)
where θFI(zt+1, zt) =
(
oF (zt+1)
oF (zt)
)− 1−σ
σ
ρ2
. The following proposition and Figure 3.2
summarize the result in this case.
Proposition 3.2 In the economy with the CIA timing under the forward-looking
interest rate rule, equilibrium path is determinate if
(1− σ)ρ2η
φ− 1 ≥ 0. Otherwise,
equilibrium indeterminacy may emerge.
3.3.3 Intuitive Implication
Under the forward-looking interest control rules,
(1− σ)ρ2η
φ− 1 > 0 is a sufficient
condition for equilibrium determinacy in the case of CIA timing, while it is not
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in the case of CWID timing. We investigate the role of the timing of households’
money.
For example, we consider the case under which agents have a preference with σ >
1 and forward-looking monetary policy rule is passive (φ < 1) so that
(1− σ)ρ2η
φ− 1 >
0 is satisfied. Suppose that the economy initially stays in the balanced-growth
equilibrium and that a rise of the growth rate of economy is anticipated. According
to this anticipation, each agent increases capital accumulation and thus the ratio of
consumption to capital z becomes lower (zt < z
∗). If z can be higher again, it is also
equilibrium path and thus equilibrium indeterminacy holds. We assume zt < zt+1.
Then, the rate of inflation falls (pit > pit+1) over time under the passive interest
control rule. As shown in Section 3.2.3, this effect results from the generalization of
the interest control rule.
When the timing of money holdings is CIA, the growth rate of consumption
corresponds to that of the opportunity cost of holding money at the same periods.
This is the reason why the result shown in Proposition 3.2 is close to the finding
in Chapter 2 which constructs a continuous-time formulation. If consumption and
real money balances are substitutes, decreasing the opportunity cost means a fall
of consumption, which contradicts to a rise of z. Therefore, z should diminish
over time so that determinacy holds. In the CWID timing, this mechanism is not
effective, because the timing of the growth rate of the opportunity cost of holding
money which affects the rate of consumption growth is different from the case of
CIA. Therefore, a higher z can be realized and indeterminacy may be generated.
3.4 Current-looking Rule
3.4.1 CWID Timing
A complete dynamic system in the case of CWID consists of the following difference
equations:
pit+1 = (pi
∗)−(φ−1)(pit)φ
(
1 + A− δ − zt
1 + A− δ − z∗
)η
, (3.23)
zt+1 = [θ
∗θCW (pit, zt+1, zt)− A+ δ + zt]zt, (3.24)
where θCW (pit, zt+1, zt) =
(
oC(pit+1, zt+1)
oC(pit, zt)
)− 1−σ
σ
ρ2
, because pit+1 = pi
C(pit, zt). The
results for equilibrium determinacy around the balanced-growth path are summa-
rized in the propositions below and Figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.3: The CWID timing with current-looking rule
Proposition 3.3 Suppose that money holding satisfies the CWID timing and that
the interest-rate control is active (φ > 1) and current-looking. Then, the equilibrium
path is determinate either if η is small or if (1−σ)ρ2η = 0. If η is sufficiently large,
indeterminacy may emerge.
Proposition 3.4 In the case of the CWID timing and the passive current-looking
monetary policy rule (φ < 1), equilibrium indeterminacy is generated.
3.4.2 CIA Timing
Since oC(pit−1, zt−1) = A+1−δ− 1
pit
, a complete dynamic system in this case consists
of (3.23) and
zt+1 = [θ
∗θCI(pit, zt)− A+ δ + zt]zt, (3.25)
where θ∗θCI(pit, zt) =
(
oC(pit, zt)
oC(pit−1, zt−1)
)− 1−σ
σ
ρ2
. The main results obtained in this
system are summarized as the following propositions and Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.4: The CIA timing with current-looking rule
Proposition 3.5 Assume that the money holdings satisfies the CIA timing and that
the interest-rate control is active current-looking (φ > 1). Then equilibrium determi-
nacy holds if (1− σ)ρ2η ≥ 0. Otherwise, the equilibrium path can be indeterminate
when η is large.
Proposition 3.6 Assume that the economy with the CIA timing under the passive
current-looking interest-rate control rule (φ < 1). If (1−σ)ρ2η ≥ 0, balanced growth
path is a saddlepoint so that indeterminacy emerges. Otherwise, the equilibrium path
is determinate when η is large.
3.4.3 Intuitive Implication
Under the current-looking monetary policy rule, we also should consider the dynam-
ics of inflation as well as that of z. The result for equilibrium determinacy seems to
be more complex than under the forward-looking rule. We roughly discuss intuition.
Suppose the rates of both inflation and income growth rise. If monetary policy is
passive (φ < 1), the inflation converges to the target rate. However, when nominal
interest rate responds to the growth rate of income much strongly, inflation can
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deviate from the target rate, as well as the active monetary policy 7. Therefore,
generalization of the Taylor rule might be a source for equilibrium determinacy in
this case.
However, this change affects the dynamics of z, and the timing of the money-in-
the-utility may play a significant role as shown in the previous section. For instance,
if inflation and thus the opportunity cost of holding money are higher over time, the
growth rate of consumption rises when consumption and real money balances are
substitutes (σ > 1), that is, z can be larger. Under the CWID (resp. CIA), passive
interest control and σ > 1 does not (resp. could) generate equilibrium determinacy,
due to the difference as shown in Section 3.3.3. Macroeconomic stability depends
on the total effects.
3.5 Endogenous vs Exogenous Growth
We summarize the results for equilibrium determinacy in Table 3.1. We have shown
that the generalized Taylor rule has a pivotal effect on economic stability in the AK
growth model. Furthermore, the generalization gives the discrete-time AK model
the role of the timing of the money in the utility. In contrast, Meng and Yip (2004)
claim that a generalized Taylor rule may not yield indeterminacy in the standard
neoclassical growth model.
To see the reason for the presence of such a difference, we consider a continuous-
time model for simplicity 8. Substituting the interest-rate control ruleR = R(pi, f(k), g)
into the non-arbitrage condition, R − pi = f ′(k) − δ, and linearizing it around the
steady state, we obtain:
(R1 − 1)pˆi +R2f ′kˆ +R3gˆ = f ′′kˆ. (3.26)
Suppose that R1 > 1, that is, monetary policy rule is active.
In an exogenous growth model, it holds that R3 = 0 and f ′′ < 0 < f ′, so that
(3.26) becomes pˆi =
f ′′ −R2f ′
R1 − 1 kˆ, which satisfies
dpˆi
dkˆ
< 0, regardless whether R2 is
zero or positive. We describe this result more intuitively. Assume that capital is
7Of course, the rate of inflation always deviates from the target rate under the generalized active
monetary policy. Such an asymmetry between active interest-rate control and passive one implies
that of the result concerning equilibrium determinacy.
8Notations are the same in the model of Section 3.2, and time index is omitted. xˆ means a
deviation from the steady state as in Appendix 3.A.
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Table 3.1: Equilibrium Determinacy
CWID, FL (3.3.1) σ < 1 σ = 1 1 < σ FL with η = 0 CWID CIA
φ > 1 D, I D D, I φ > 1 D D
φ < 1 D, I D D, I φ < 1 D D
CIA, FL (3.3.2) σ < 1 σ = 1 1 < σ CL with η = 0 CWID CIA
φ > 1 D D D, I φ > 1 D D
φ < 1 D, I D D φ < 1 I I
CWID, CL (3.4.1) σ < 1 σ = 1 1 < σ φ = η = 0 σ < 1 σ = 1 1 < σ
φ > 1 D, I D D, I CWID D D D
φ < 1 I I I CIA D D D
CIA, CL (3.4.2) σ < 1 σ = 1 1 < σ
φ > 1 D D D, I
φ < 1 I I I, D
FL=forward-looking rule, CL=current-looking rule
D=determinate, I=indeterminate
ex)”D, I”=determinate for low η, and indeterminate for high η
increasing from the steady state. In the case of neoclassical production, it lowers
the real rate of return on capital. Therefore, the real interest rate should fall for
the non-arbitrage condition. If the interest-rate control rule is active, the rate of
inflation must be lower. Fall width of the inflation rate becomes bigger as much as
nominal interest rate rises for the generalization of the Taylor rule, but there is not
a qualitative change so that equilibrium determinacy still always holds.
On the other hand, when the AK technology is assumed, the property of equi-
librium rate of inflation is dramatically changed for the generalization of the Taylor
rule. With R2 = 0 and f ′′ = 0 < f ′, (3.26) is rewritten as pˆi = −R3R1 − 1 gˆ. Hence,
pˆi = 0 if R3 = 0 and dpˆi
dgˆ
< 0 if R3 > 0. Intuition is similar as in Section 3.3. There-
fore, the generalization of interest-rate control may affect macroeconomic stability.
A difference of the structure in the real rate of return on capital is the main reason
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for a stark contrast in equilibrium determinacy conditions between the neoclassical
and AK growth models.
This difference may affect the analysis of the discrete-time models. Chapter 1,
a discrete-time version of Meng and Yip (2004) 9, shows that the timing of house-
holds’ money could be a little more significant even though the interest-rate control
responds only to the inflation rate, in contrast to the AK model in which it is not
effective at all if the Taylor rule is not generalized. However, when the monetary
policy rule is generalized, while the result in Chapter 1 cannot be expected to change
drastically due to the structure of the equilibrium rate of inflation as shown above,
the importance of the timing of money in the utility becomes clear in this chapter.
3.6 Conclusion
By use of a discrete-time AK growth model with money, we have investigated the
stabilization effect of a generalized Taylor rule under which the nominal interest
rate responds to the growth rate of income as well as to the rate of inflation. The
central messages of our study are as follows. First, if the interest-rate control is
sensitive to the growth rate of income, monetary policy rule may play a pivotal role
for economic stability even in a simple environment in which money is superneutral
in the balanced growth equilibrium. Second, our discrete-time modelling clearly
demonstrates that the timings of money holding of the households and the time
perspective of the monetary authority critically affect the efficacy of interest control
rules. This aspect cannot be considered in the foregoing studies on equilibrium
determinacy of monetary AK growth models in continuous-time settings and on the
interest-rate control in which the nominal interest rate responds only to the rate of
inflation.
Appendix 3.A: Calculation
In all four cases of Sections 3.3 and 3.4, we use the same step for obtaining the
reduced dynamic system. First, using (3.12), (3.13), (3.19) and (3.20), we derive
the demand for real money balances in each case. Second, we substitute this money
9For example, Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) also analyze the discrete-time model, but the timing
of the nominal interest rate is different from the models in Chapter 1 and this chapter.
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demand function into (3.3), which gives the Euler equation. The growth rate of
consumption in each case consists of two parts: a common balanced growth rate of
consumption obtained in the standard AK growth model, θ∗ ≡ {β(1+A−δ)} 1σ , and
the part related to the growth rate of the opportunity cost of holding money. Note
that the timing of the growth rate of the opportunity cost of holding money is one
period ahead in the case of CIA than that of CWID. Using these Euler equations
and the capital dynamics (3.16), we obtain the dynamics of zt in each case.
We linearize the equations of the system in each case around the balanced-growth
path to examine local equilibrium determinacy.
Forward-looking Rule and CWID Timing (Section 3.3.1)
We show the step formally in the case of CWID with forward-looking rule (Section
3.3.1). From (3.12) and (3.19),
mt =
ρ2
ρ1
(1 + A− δ) ct
oF (zt+1)
. (3.27)
Substituting this into (3.3), we obtain
λt = ρ1
{
ρ2
ρ1
(1 + A− δ)
}ρ2(1−σ) oF (zt+1)−ρ2(1−σ)
cσt
. (3.28)
Thus the Euler equation can be expressed as
ct+1
ct
= {β(1 + A− δ)} 1σ
(
oF (zt+2)
oF (zt+1)
)− 1−σ
σ
ρ2
= θ∗θFW (zt+2, zt+1). (3.29)
From (3.21), we obtain the linearized equation
zˆt+2 =
(
1− 1
z∗θ∗θ¯FWz
)
zˆt+1 +
1 + z∗
z∗θ∗θ¯FWz
zˆt, (3.30)
where zˆt ≡ zt − z∗ and
θ¯FWz ≡
∂θFW
∂zt+1
∣∣∣∣
ss
= −∂θ
FW
∂zt+2
∣∣∣∣
ss
=
1− σ
σ
ρ2η
[pi∗(1 + A− δ)− 1](φ− 1)θ∗ .
Equation (3.30) is derived from zˆt+1 = z
∗θ∗θ¯FWz (zˆt+1 − zˆt+2) + (1 + z∗)zˆt. In this
dynamic system, there are two jump variables, zt+1 and zt. Thus equilibrium de-
terminacy holds if the two roots of the characteristic equation of (3.30) are out of
the unit circle. When θ¯FWz = 0, equation (3.30) becomes zˆt+1 = (1 + z
∗)zˆt, which
implies that there is a unique equilibrium path 10.
10The generalization of the Taylor rule is not effective alone. If (1 − σ)ρ2 = 0 is satisfied, we
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Forward-looking Rule and CIA Timing (Section 3.3.2)
The Euler equation in this system is
ct+1
ct
= {β(1 + A− δ)} 1σ
(
oF (zt+1)
oF (zt)
)− 1−σ
σ
ρ2
= θ∗θFI(zt+1, zt). (3.31)
Linearizing the system (3.22), we obtain
zˆt+1 =
(
1 +
z∗
1 + z∗θ∗θ¯FWz
)
zˆt. (3.32)
To derive (3.32), we use zˆt+1 = (1 + z
∗)zˆt − z∗θ∗θ¯FWz (zˆt+1 − zˆt). Since zt is a jump
variable, the condition for indeterminacy is
(
1 +
z∗
1 + z∗θ∗θ¯FWz
)2
< 1, that is,
z∗(z∗ + 2 + 2z∗θ∗θ¯FWz )
(1 + z∗θ∗θ¯FWz )2
< 0.
Since z∗ > 0, the condition can be rewritten such that z∗ +2+ 2z∗θ∗θ¯FWz < 0. This
can be satisfied when θ¯FWz < 0.
Current-looking Rule and CWID Timing (Section 3.4.1)
Using pit+1 = pi
C(pit, zt) in (3.33), we obtain the Euler equation in this system:
ct+1
ct
= {β(1 + A− δ)} 1σ
(
oC(pit+1, zt+1)
oC(pit, zt)
)− 1−σ
σ
ρ2
= θ∗θCW (pit, zt+1, zt). (3.33)
The system (3.23)-(3.24) linearized at the balanced-growth path is[
pˆit+1
zˆt+1
]
=
 φ −ηpi∗θ∗
Xpi Xz
[pˆit
zˆt
]
, (3.34)
where
Xpi = −φ
η
z∗
pi∗
(θ∗)2θ¯CWz (φ− 1)
(φ− 1)− z∗θ∗θ¯CWz
and Xz =
(1 + z∗ + z∗θ∗θ¯CWz )(φ− 1)
(φ− 1)− z∗θ∗θ¯CWz
.
obtain the standard results in the AK growth model with the Taylor rule under which the nominal
interest rate responds to inflation alone, even though η > 0. Two factors neutralizing the effect of
the opportunity cost of holding money eliminate the efficacy of the generalized Taylor rule. The
first is ρ2 = 0, which means no need for money. Secondly, when the utility is additively separable
(σ = 1), the optimal consumption is independent from the demand for real money holdings.
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The linearized dynamic equation of zt in (3.34) is derived from(
1− z
∗
φ− 1θ
∗θ¯CWz
)
zˆt+1 = (1 + z
∗ + z∗θ∗θ¯CWz )zˆt −
φ
η
z∗
pi∗
(θ∗)2θ¯CWz pˆit,
where
θ¯CWz ≡
∂θCW
∂zt
∣∣∣∣
ss
=
1− σ
σ
η(φ− 1)
(pi∗(1 + A− δ)− 1)θ∗
= (φ− 1)∂θ
CW
∂zt+1
∣∣∣∣
ss
= −ρ2η
φ
pi∗
θ∗
∂θCW
∂pit
∣∣∣∣
ss
= (φ− 1)2θ¯FWz .
There are two jump variables, pit and zt, in this system so that equilibrium determi-
nacy emerges when two roots of the characteristic equation of (3.34) are out of the
unit circle.
Current-looking Rule and CIA Timing (Section 3.4.2)
The Euler equation in this case is given by
ct+1
ct
= {β(1 + A− δ)} 1σ
(
oC(pit, zt)
oC(pit−1, zt−1)
)− 1−σ
σ
ρ2
= θ∗θCI(pit, zt). (3.35)
We use oC(pit−1, zt−1) = A+ 1− δ − 1
pit
.
Linearizing (3.23) and (3.25) yields
[
pˆit+1
zˆt+1
]
=
 φ −ηpi
∗
θ∗
−φ− 1
ηpi∗
(θ∗)2θ¯CIz z
∗ 1 + z∗ + z∗θ∗θ¯CIz
[pˆit
zˆt
]
, (3.36)
where
θ¯CIz ≡
∂θCI
∂zt
∣∣∣∣
ss
=
1− σ
σ
ρ2
η
(pi∗(1 + A− δ)− 1)θ∗
= − η
φ− 1
pi∗
θ∗
∂θCI
∂pit
∣∣∣∣
ss
=
θ¯CWz
φ− 1
= (φ− 1)θ¯FWz .
There are two jump variables pit and zt in this system so local equilibrium determi-
nacy requires that the balanced-growth equilibrium is a source.
Chapter 4
Growth, Velocity, and Equilibrium
Determinacy in a
Cash-In-Advance Economy
In this chapter, we introduce money as the cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint and
analyze a role of generalized Taylor rule in an AK growth model. We assume that
the CIA constraint applies to investment as well as to consumption, and thus money
is not superneutral even on the balanced-growth path. This is in marked contrast
to the monetary endogenous growth models discussed in the previous two chapters
where money fails to affect long-term growth. In what follows, we focus on the
two issues. In Part A of this chapter, we examine equilibrium determinacy of the
balanced-growth path. In Part B, we consider a general CIA constraint and discuss
the long-run relation between velocity of money and monetary expansion.
Part A: Growth and Determinacy
4.1 Introduction to Part A
This part examines the stabilization role of interest-rate control in an AK model of
endogenous growth with a cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint. We assume that the
liquidity constraint applies not only to consumption spending but also to a part of
investment expenditure, so that money is not superneutral on the balanced growth
path (BGP). It is also assumed that the monetary authority may adjust the nominal
interest rate in response to the growth rate of income control as well as to the rate
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of inflation 1.
Using a rather simple setting mentioned above, we obtain two main findings.
First, if the monetary authority controls the nominal interest rate in response to
the rate of inflation alone, then the BGP is uniquely given and it satisfies global
determinacy. This conclusion is in contrast to the result claimed by Suen and Yip
(2005) and Chen and Guo (2008a) who show that in an AK growth model with
CIA constraint on investment there may exist dual BGPs and one of them is locally
indeterminate, if the intertemporal elasticity in consumption of the representative
household is less than one 2. Since they assume that the money growth rate is kept
constant, our discussion reveals that indeterminacy found by Suen and Yip (2005)
and Chen and Guo (2008a) critically depends on their assumption of monetary
supply rule.
Our second finding is that if investment is subject to the CIA constraint and if the
nominal interest rate responds to the growth rate of income as well, then the unique
BGP may be indeterminate if the interest rate responds either more or less than
one for one to inflation. This result is substantially different from Meng and Yip’s
(2004) result claiming that the generalized Taylor rule we use does not produce
indeterminacy in a neoclassical (exogenous) growth model 3. Our study suggests
that, as well as in short-run models (e.g. Benhabib et. al. (2001a)), the form
of Taylor-type interest control rule should be carefully selected in an endogenous
growth setting.
4.2 The Base Model
The economy is populated by a continuum of identical infinitely-lived households
with a unit mass. Each household has perfect foresight and maximizes a discounted
stream of utilities ∫ ∞
0
c1−σ
1− σe
−ρtdt, σ > 0, 0 < ρ < 1, (4.1)
1This assumption is according to Taylor (1993), but the response to the growth rate of income
is often ignored in economic models.
2Suen and Yip (2005) consider a CIA constraint in which all consumption purchases and all
gross investment are financed by real money holdings.
3Using a neoclassical growth model with a generalized CIA constraint, Li and Yip (2004) show
that a passive interest control may generate indeterminacy even if the nominal interest rate does
not respond to the level of income. The difference between their conclusion and our finding relies
on the difference in the assumption on production technology.
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where c is consumption, ρ denotes the time discount rate, and σ is the inverse of
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption. The budget constraint
for the representative household is
m˙ = y − pim− c− ν + τ, (4.2)
where ν is gross investment, y is output, pi ≡ P˙
P
is the rate of inflation, P the price
level, and m denotes the real money balances that equal the nominal money supply
M divided P . The seigniorage is returned to households from the government as a
lump-sum transfer so that τ = m˙+ pim.
The production function is given by
y = Ak, A > 0, (4.3)
where k is the household’s capital stock. Capital stock changes according to
k˙ = ν − δk, 0 < δ < 1, k0 : given (4.4)
where δ is the capital depreciation rate.
The representative household also faces the following generalized CIA constraint:
c+ ψν ≤ m,ψ ∈ [0, 1]. (4.5)
Namely, all consumption purchases and a fraction ψ of gross investment must be
financed by the household’s real money balances; and the remaining fraction (1−ψ)
of investment goods are credit goods.
The representative household maximizes (4.1) subject to (4.2)-(4.5). The first-
order conditions are
c−σ = λ+ ζ, (4.6)
µ− λ = ψζ, (4.7)
µ˙ = (ρ+ δ)µ− Aλ, (4.8)
λ˙ = (ρ+ pi)λ− ζ, (4.9)
ζ(m− c− ψν) = 0, ζ ≥ 0, m ≥ c+ ψν, (4.10)
together with the transversality conditions lim
t→∞
e−ρtλtmt = 0 and lim
t→∞
e−ρtµtkt = 0,
where λ and µ are the utility values of real money balances and capital, respectively,
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and ζ represents the Lagrange multiplier for the CIA constraint (4.5). In the fol-
lowing, we assume that the CIA constraint (4.5) is strictly binding in equilibrium,
and thus ζ > 0 for all t.
The market equilibrium condition for commodity is y = k˙+ δk+ c, which yields
k˙
k
= A− δ − z, (4.11)
where z ≡ c
k
.
Following Taylor (1993), we assume that the monetary authority adjusts the
nominal interest rate by observing the level of real income as well as the rate of
inflation. Since we deal with a growing economy in which real income continuously
expands, we assume that the monetary authority changes the nominal interest rate in
response not to the level of income but to the growth rate of income. The monetary
policy rule is specified as
R = R(pi, g) = pi∗
(
pi
pi∗
)φ
+ (A− δ)
(
g
g∗
)η
, φ ≥ 0, φ 6= 1, η ≥ 0, A > δ,
(4.12)
where R is the nominal interest rate, g =
y˙
y
=
k˙
k
= A− δ − z is the growth rate of
income, g∗ is the balanced-growth rate of income and pi∗ > 0 is the target rate of
inflation. If φ > 1, the nominal interest rate rises more than one for one in response
to a change in the rate of inflation. In this case, the interest control rule is said
to be active as to inflation. Conversely, the rule (4.12) with φ < 1 is defined as a
passive monetary policy.
Combining (4.12) with the Fisher equation, R − pi = A − δ, which implies that
the real interest rate equals to the real rate of return to capital, we see that the
equilibrium rate of inflation depends on z and thus it is expressed as pi = pi(z). This
function satisfies that sign[pi′(z)]=sign(φ− 1) if η > 0 around the BGP, because
dpi
dz
∣∣∣∣
BGP
=
A− δ
A− δ − z∗
η
φ− 1 . (4.13)
When the growth rate of income increases, the central bank should raise the nominal
interest rate to stabilize economy. However, since the net real rate of return to
capital is constant due to the assumption of AK technology, the real interest rate
also should be kept constant by controlling the rate of inflation to satisfy the Fisher
equation. This is achieved by reducing inflation if the monetary policy is active,
because the fall in nominal interest rate is larger than that in the inflation rate.
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4.3 Balanced Growth Path and Equilibrium De-
terminacy
We focus on the economy’s BGP on which output, consumption and capital grow at
a common, positive constant rate. Denoting p ≡ µ
λ
and using (4.6) through (4.9),
we obtain the following dynamic equations:
c˙
c
=
1
σ
[
l(p)
p˙
p
+
A
p
− ρ− δ
]
, (4.14)
µ˙
µ
= ρ+ δ − A
p
, (4.15)
λ˙
λ
=
(
ρ+ pi(z) +
1
ψ
)
− p
ψ
, (4.16)
where l(p) = − 1− ψ
p− (1− ψ) . Equations (4.11), (4.14), (4.15) and (4.16) give (4.17)
and (4.18) as below:
z˙ =
{
1
σ
[
l(p)
p˙
p
+
A
p
− ρ− δ
]
− A+ δ
}
z + z2, (4.17)
p˙ =
p2
ψ
+
(
δ − pi(z)− 1
ψ
)
p− A. (4.18)
It is obvious that the BGP is realized when both z and p stay constant over time so
that the balanced growth rate is
θ =
1
σ
[
A
p∗
− ρ− δ
]
= A− δ − z∗, (4.19)
where p∗ and z∗ are the steady-state values of p and z
(
=
c
k
)
.
We first consider the case of ψ = 0 in which money is required only for real
purchases of the consumption goods. Then, from (4.7), a relative price of capital to
money p always equals one. Therefore, the dynamic equation is
z˙ =
[
A− ρ− δ
σ
− A+ δ
]
z + z2. (4.20)
As we can see from this equation, the interest-rate control rule is not functional even
if it is generalized. Assuming that σ >
A− ρ− δ
A− δ to satisfy z
∗ > 0, we find that the
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BGP is uniquely determined. As usual, in this case money is superneutral on the
BGP and the feasible BGP with a positive z satisfies global determinacy 4.
Next, consider the generalized case in which ψ 6= 0. In this case, the BGP is
uniquely determined and it holds that p∗ > 1 − ψ. To show this, note that the
following facts:
p˙(p = 0; z = z∗) = −A < 0,
p˙(p = 1− ψ; z = z∗) = −A− (1− ψ)[1 + pi∗ − δ] < 0, and
p˙(p = 1; z = z∗) = −(A− δ)− pi∗ < 0.
Hence, the number of nontrivial BGP that satisfy p∗ > 1 > 1 − ψ > 0 is only one,
implying that the corresponding z∗(> 0) is also uniquely given. Moreover, we can
prove that
∂p∗
∂ψ
> 0,
∂z∗
∂ψ
> 0 and
∂θ
∂ψ
< 0.
We linearize the dynamic system (4.17) and (4.18) around the BGP to obtain:[
z˙
p˙
]
=
[
z˙z z˙p
p˙z p˙p
][
zˆ
pˆ
]
= J
[
zˆ
pˆ
]
, (4.21)
where zˆ ≡ z − z∗ and pˆ ≡ p− p∗. The elements of matrix J are:
z˙z =
∂z˙
∂z
∣∣∣∣
BGP
=
[
l(p∗)p˙z
σp∗
+ 1
]
z∗ =
(
−pi
′(z∗)l(p∗)
σ
+ 1
)
z∗,
z˙p =
∂z˙
∂p
∣∣∣∣
BGP
=
z∗
σ(p∗)2
[l(p∗)p˙pp∗ − A] = − z
∗
σp∗
p∗(1− ψ) + Aψ
ψ[p∗ − (1− ψ)] ,
p˙z =
∂p˙
∂z
∣∣∣∣
BGP
= −pi′(z∗)p∗,
p˙p =
∂p˙
∂p
∣∣∣∣
BGP
=
A
p∗
+
p∗
ψ
> 0.
Thus, the trace and determinant of J are respectively given by:
trJ = z˙z + p˙p =
(
−pi
′(z∗)l(p∗)
σ
+ 1
)
z∗ +
A
p∗
+
p∗
ψν
, (4.22)
detJ = z˙zp˙p − z˙pp˙z = z
∗
p∗
[
Aψν + (p
∗)2
ψν
− Api
′(z∗)
σ
]
. (4.23)
4By use of a money-in-the-utility-function model of endogenous growth in which money is
superneutral on the BGP, Chapters 2 and 3 reveal that indeterminacy may hold if the interest rate
responds to the growth rate of income. Thus, superneutrality of money may not always establish
determinacy of equilibrium in endogenous growth models.
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Since z and p are jump variables, if trJ > 0 and detJ > 0, then the BGP is totally
unstable so that the economy always stays on the BGP, that is, the equilibrium
path is determinate. Otherwise, the equilibrium path is indeterminate. Note that if
pi′(z∗) = 0, that is, if the interest-control is controlled by the rate of inflation alone,
then the equilibrium path is determinate since both trJ and detJ are positive even
if money is not superneutral. Note that if η = 0, then detJ > 0, implying that the
equilibrium path is determinate even if money is not superneutral. If
η
φ− 1 > 0,
detJ may be negative from (4.23), so that equilibrium path might be indeterminate.
On the contrary, detJ > 0 when
η
φ− 1 < 0, but trJ may be negative.
To sum up, we have obtained the following results:
Proposition 4.1 Either if η = 0 or if ψ = 0, the equilibrium path is determinate.
Proposition 4.2 In the case of 0 < ψ ≤ 1 and η > 0, equilibrium path may be
indeterminate under low |φ− 1|.
In the above, we have shown that the generalization of the CIA constraint has
a pivotal effect on equilibrium determinacy. If the CIA constraint is not effective
to investment, the utility value of real money balances equals that of capital due to
the monetary superneutrality and thus the relative price of capital is one over time.
Therefore, even if the Taylor rule is generalized, it fails to affect dynamic behavior
of the economy.
When real purchases of both consumption and investment are subject to the
CIA constraint, economic stability depends on two forces. The first is the portfolio
substitution effect. Suppose that agents expect a rise of the rate of economic growth
without fundamentals and thus they anticipate that the consumption-capital ratio
z decreases. As shown in Section 4.2, the rate of inflation falls if monetary policy
is active. This diminishes the relative value of capital p due to the decrease in the
need of capital. Then, the growth rate of income increases. When the interest-rate
control is not generalized, the rate of inflation is fixed at the target rate. Therefore,
the portfolio substitution effect described above is not effective.
The intertemporal substitution effect is the second one. Under active policy,
nominal growth rate may be negative and it can make investment lower, which has
a negative effect on economic growth.
If the interest-rate control is passive, converse discussion holds. Totally, opti-
mistic expectations may be self-fulfilling under active interest-rate control, and thus
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equilibrium indeterminacy can emerge. When
∣∣∣∣ ηφ− 1
∣∣∣∣ is high, the equilibrium rate
of inflation should be more larger so that instability may emerge easily.
Part B: Growth and Velocity of Money
4.4 Introduction to Part B
In this part, we examine the long-run effects of an endogenous monetary expansion
via the interest-rate control on income growth and on the velocity of money in the
context of an AK growth model with a cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint.
In the existing literature, Suen and Yip (2005) and Chen and Guo (2008a) also
study the AK growth model with a CIA constraint. The main finding of those studies
can be summarized as follows. First, if the interetemporal elasticity of substitution
in consumption is less than one, the balanced growth path is unique and determinate,
while there may exist dual balanced growth paths if the interetermporal elasticity
of substitution in consumption is higher than one. In the latter case, the balance-
growth path (BGP) with a higher growth rate is locally indeterminate and there is a
positive relation between the growth rate of nominal money supply and the velocity
of money. Such a positive relationship is, however, empirically implausible. Chen
and Guo (2008b) overcome this problem by assuming that the CIA constraint is
more effective on investment than on consumption. They justify this assumption
based on the recent increases in the consumer credit and in the cash holdings of
firms.
These foregoing studies mentioned above assume that the central bank keeps
the growth rate of nominal money supply constant. However, many central banks
have shifted their policy stance from the base-money targeting to the interest-rate
control, we re-examine the long-run relation between monetary growth and velocity
of money under interest-rate control rules. Except for the monetary policy rule, we
employ the same analytical framework as Chen and Guo (2008b) use.
The present part reveals that the relation between money growth and velocity of
money around the BGP depends on the stance of the monetary policy as well as on
the form of CIA constraint. When the nominal interest rate responds to the current
rate of inflation alone, the velocity of money is negatively related to the growth rate
of nominal money supply around the unique BGP, if the CIA constraint is more
binding for investment than consumption. However, if the interest rate responds to
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the growth rate of income as well and it responds to inflation more than one for
one, then a lower velocity of money may be associated with a higher money growth
under the normal CIA constraint which is more effective for consumption spending
than for investment expenditure.
4.5 An Extension of the Base Model
The representative household’s problem is to maximize a discounted stream of util-
ities ∫ ∞
0
c1−σ
1− σe
−ρtdt, σ > 0, ρ > 0, (4.24)
subject to
m˙ = y − pim− c− ν + τ, (4.25)
k˙ = ν − δk, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, k0 : given, (4.26)
ψcc+ ψνν ≤ m, 0 < ψc ≤ 1, 0 ≤ ψν ≤ 1, (4.27)
where c is consumption, ρ denotes the time discount rate, k is the household’s capital
stock, δ denotes the capital depreciation rate and σ is the inverse of the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution in consumption. Moreover, ν is gross investment,
y is output, pi ≡ P˙
P
is the rate of inflation, P the price level, and m denotes the
real money balances that equal the nominal money supply M divided by P . The
household follows the budget constraint (4.25) and the dynamics of capital stock
(4.26). The generalized CIA constraint (4.27) means that parts of consumption and
gross investment must be financed by the household’s real money balances. The
seigniorage is returned to households from the government as a lump-sum transfer
so that the government’s budget constraint is τ = m˙+ pim.
The production function is given by
y = Ak, A > 0, (4.28)
and thus the market equilibrium condition for commodity, y = k˙ + δk + c, yields
k˙
k
= A− δ − z, (4.29)
where z ≡ c
k
.
Following Taylor (1993), we assume that the monetary authority controls the
nominal interest rate by observing the real income as well as inflation. Since we
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deal with a growing economy in which real income continuously expands, we assume
that the monetary authority changes the nominal interest rate in response not to
the level of income but to the growth rate of income. Specifically, we assume the
following control rule:
R = R(pi, g) = pi∗
(
pi
pi∗
)φ
+ (A− δ)
(
g
g∗
)η
, φ ≥ 0, φ 6= 1, η ≥ 0, A > δ,
(4.30)
where R is the nominal interest rate, and g denotes the growth rate of real income
given by
g =
y˙
y
=
k˙
k
= A− δ − z. (4.31)
In addition, g∗ > 0 represents the balanced-growth rate of income and pi∗ > 0
denotes the target rate of inflation. If φ > 1, the nominal interest rate rises more
than one for one in response to a change in the rate of inflation. In this case, the
interest control rule is said to be active as to inflation. Conversely, the rule (4.30)
with φ < 1 is defined as a passive monetary policy.
We focus on the economy’s BGP on which income, capital, consumption and
real money balances grow at a common rate. Combining (4.30) and (4.31) with the
Fisher equation,
R− pi = A− δ, (4.32)
which implies that the real interest rate equals to the real rate of return to capital,
we obtain
A− δ + pi = pi∗
(
pi
pi∗
)φ
+ (A− δ)
(
A− δ − z
g∗
)η
. (4.33)
Therefore, we see that the equilibrium rate of inflation depends on z, that is, pi =
pi(z).
We consider the case in which ψν is non-zero
5. Denoting λm and λk as the
shadow prices of real money balances and capital, we define p ≡ λk
λm
. As shown in
Appendix 4.A, we obtain the following dynamic system:
z˙ =
{
1
σ
[
l(p)
p˙
p
+
A
p
− ρ− δ
]
− A+ δ
}
z + z2, (4.34)
p˙ =
p2
ψν
+
(
δ − pi(z)− 1
ψν
)
p− A. (4.35)
5Since money is superneutral when ψν = 0, interesting result cannot be obtained even if ψc > 0.
Technically, p = 1 for all t so that the dynamic system is consisted by z alone and it does not
depend on ψc.
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where l(p) = − ψc − ψν
ψcp− (ψc − ψν) . Note that sign[l(p)] = −sign[ψc − ψν ], since p > 1
from the assumption that the CIA constraint is strictly binding in equilibrium.
4.6 Velocity of Money
In the BGP where z˙ = p˙ = 0 in (4.34) and (4.35), we obtain
g∗ =
1
σ
[
A
p∗
− ρ− δ
]
= A− δ − z∗ > 0, (4.36)
p∗
ψν
+ δ − pi∗ − 1
ψν
− A
p∗
= 0. (4.37)
As above conditions show, the BGP is uniquely determined 6, regardless of the
magnitude of σ, which is in a marked contrast to the model with a fixed growth rate
of nominal money supply. Moreover, from (4.33),
pi′(z∗) =
dpi
dz
∣∣∣∣
BGP
=
A− δ
A− δ − z∗
η
φ− 1 , (4.38)
and therefore sign[pi′(z∗)]=sign
[
η
φ− 1
]
is satisfied around the BGP.
From now on, we investigate the relation between the velocity and the monetary
expansion rate. Defining
M˙
M
= µ, and using (4.27), (4.28) and ν = y − c, we can
represent the growth rate of money as following 7:
µ = µ(z, p) = q(z)
z˙
z
+ A− δ − z + pi(z), (4.39)
where q(z) ≡ (ψc − ψν)z
(ψc − ψν)z + ψνA is positive (resp. negative) if ψc > ψν (resp. ψc <
ψν). Under the interest-control rule, the nominal growth rate of money supply is
endogenously determined. Since the growth rate of real money supply equals that
of real income around the BGP, that is,
m˙
m
= g∗, we derive
µ∗ = A− δ − z∗ + pi(z∗). (4.40)
6From (4.35), we have two p∗s, but one of them is negative, while another is positive and satisfies
p∗ > 1 since p˙(p = 1; z = z∗) = −(A− δ)− pi∗ < 0. Therefore, the number of plausible p∗ is only
one. Under the unique p∗, we can give the nontrivial unique z∗. Determinacy of this unique BGP
is detailed in Appendix 4.A.
7Substituting
m˙
m
= µ− pi and z˙
z
=
c˙
c
− k˙
k
into m = (ψc − ψν)c+ ψνAk, we can obtain (4.39).
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Table 4.1: The Relation between Velocity and Money Supply
ψc > ψν ψc < ψν ψc = ψν
η > 0, φ > 1, high A−δ
g∗ − + 0
η > 0, φ > 1, low A−δ
g∗ + − 0
η > 0, 0 < φ < 1 + − 0
η = 0 + − 0
As a result, we can obtain
dµ∗
dz∗
= pi′(z∗)− 1 = A− δ
A− δ − z∗
η
φ− 1 − 1, (4.41)
and thus
sign
(
dµ∗
dz∗
)
= sign
(
η
φ− 1 −
A− δ − z∗
A− δ
)
. (4.42)
Note that g∗ = A − δ − z∗. The income velocity of money around the BGP is
represented by
V ∗ =
y∗
m∗
=
A
(ψc − ψν)z∗ + ψνA, (4.43)
implying that
sign
(
dV ∗
dz∗
)
= −sign[ψc − ψν ]. (4.44)
Combining (4.42) and (4.44), we can describe the effect of money supply on
velocity around the BGP as in Table 4.1. In this table, + means a positive relation,
− means a negative relation and 0 indicates that there is no relation.
Now, we consider intuitive implication of the results. From (4.41), two effects
of economic growth on the nominal expansion rate of money supply can be seen.
First, a decrease z∗ yields a higher balanced-growth rate g∗. The second is the
change of the inflation rate via the interest-control rule. When the growth rate of
income increases, the central bank should raise the nominal interest rate to stabilize
economy. However, since the net real rate of return to capital is constant due
to the assumption of AK technology, the real interest rate also should be kept
constant by adjusting the rate of inflation to satisfy the Fisher equation 8. This
is achieved by depressing inflation if the monetary policy is generalized and active,
because the decline in nominal interest rate is larger than that in the inflation rate.
Therefore, the expansion rate of nominal money supply may fall. Otherwise, the
8When the interest rate is controlled by the rate of inflation alone, this channel is not effective.
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rise of economic growth does not generate the fall of the inflation rate so that the
nominal growth rate of money supply increases.
We consider the result in (4.44). In light of AK technology, decreasing z∗ gener-
ates the same magnitude of positive movement in the investment-capital ratio
ν∗
k∗
.
Therefore, if ψc > ψν , velocity of money which means the ratio of capital to real
money balances becomes larger. Conversely, when ψc < ψν , the negative relation
between the velocity and the growth rate of income is produced.
Taylor (1993) suggests that the observable policy stance of the Federal Reserve
may be described by setting φ = 1.5 and η = 0.5. Moreover, it is plausible to
consider that real investment expenditures for machines, factories and housing are
less constrained by cash holdings than consumption spending. Therefore, we focus
on the case under which η > 0, φ > 1, and ψc > ψν . When the ratio of the net real
rate of return on capital A− δ to the balanced-growth rate g∗ = A− δ− z∗ is higher
enough to satisfy 0 <
φ− 1
η
<
A− δ
g∗
, the negative relation between the nominal
money expansion and the income velocity of money holds, regardless of whether
or not the economy displays sunspot-driven fluctuations around the BGP. Since
A − δ > g∗, the condition 0 < 1 = φ− 1
η
<
A− δ
g∗
holds for φ = 1.5 and η = 0.5.
This result is different from Chen and Guo (2008b), who show that the negative
relation emerges only on the determinate BGP if ψc > ψν . Consequently, we can
conclude that both the form of the CIA constraint and the central bank’s policy
stance are important for the relation between and velocity and money expansion.
Appendix 4.A
The first-order conditions of the household’s maximization problem are
c−σ = λm + ψcζ, (4.45)
λk − λm = ψνζ, (4.46)
λ˙k = (ρ+ δ)λk − Aλm, (4.47)
λ˙m = (ρ+ pi)λm − ζ, (4.48)
ζ(m− ψcc− ψνν) = 0, ζ ≥ 0, m ≥ ψcc+ ψνν, (4.49)
together with the transversality conditions lim
t→∞
e−ρtλmtmt = 0 and lim
t→∞
e−ρtλktkt =
0, where λm and λk are the shadow prices of real money balances and capital,
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respectively, and ζ represents the Lagrange multiplier for the CIA constraint (4.27).
In the following, we assume that the CIA constraint (4.27) is strictly binding in
equilibrium, and thus ζ > 0 for all t. Using (4.45) through (4.48), we obtain the
following dynamic equations:
c˙
c
=
1
σ
[
l(p)
p˙
p
+
A
p
− ρ− δ
]
,
λ˙k
λk
= ρ+ δ − A
p
,
λ˙m
λm
=
(
ρ+ pi(z) +
1
ψν
)
− p
ψν
.
From these equations and (4.29), the dynamics equations (4.34) and (4.35) are
derived.
We linearize the dynamic system (4.34) and (4.35) around the BGP to obtain:[
z˙
p˙
]
=
[
z˙z z˙p
p˙z p˙p
][
zˆ
pˆ
]
= J
[
zˆ
pˆ
]
, (4.50)
where zˆ ≡ z− z∗ and pˆ ≡ p− p∗. The elements of matrix J (4.50) are the following:
z˙z =
∂z˙
∂z
∣∣∣∣
BGP
=
[
l(p∗)p˙z
σp∗
+ 1
]
z∗ =
(
−pi
′(z∗)l(p∗)
σ
+ 1
)
z∗,
z˙p =
∂z˙
∂p
∣∣∣∣
BGP
=
z∗
σ(p∗)2
[l(p∗)p˙pp∗ − A] = − z
∗
σp∗
p∗(ψc − ψν) + Aψcψν
ψν [ψcp∗ − (ψc − ψν)] ,
p˙z =
∂p˙
∂z
∣∣∣∣
BGP
= −pi′(z∗)p∗,
p˙p =
∂p˙
∂p
∣∣∣∣
BGP
=
A
p∗
+
p∗
ψν
> 0.
The trace and determinant of J are respectively given by:
trJ = z˙z + p˙p =
(
−pi
′(z∗)l(p∗)
σ
+ 1
)
z∗ +
A
p∗
+
p∗
ψν
, (4.51)
detJ = z˙zp˙p − z˙pp˙z = z
∗
p∗
[
Aψν + (p
∗)2
ψν
− Api
′(z∗)
σ
]
. (4.52)
Since z and p are jump variables, if trJ > 0 and detJ > 0, then the BGP is totally
unstable so that the economy always stays on the BGP, that is, the equilibrium
path is determinate. Otherwise, the equilibrium path is indeterminate. That is,
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the economy always stays on the BGP, or endogenous income fluctuations driven
by sunspots are generated. Inspecting (4.51) and (4.52), we can find the following
proposition, which shows that the generalization of the Taylor rule and the most
generalized CIA constraint play a significant role in macroeconomic stability.
Proposition 4.3 In the case of 0 < ψc, ψν ≤ 1, equilibrium determinacy holds
either if (i) monetary policy rule responds only to the rate of inflation. or if (ii) ψc ≤
ψν and monetary policy is passive. Otherwise, BGP could be locally indeterminate.
Chapter 5
Income Taxation, Interest-Rate
Control and Macroeconomic
Stability with Balanced-Budget
5.1 Introduction
Income taxation under balanced-budget rule and interest-rate control have been
considered most effective tools for establishing macroeconomic stability. If it is
appropriately selected, each policy rule may stabilize the economy by mitigating
income fluctuations. It is, however, rather unclear whether or not those fiscal and
monetary policy rules strengthen their stabilizing effects each other, if the fiscal
authority and the central bank adopts specific actions simultaneously. Although
stabilization effects of policy rules have been discussed extensively, the main stream
literature has investigated the stabilization roles of income taxation and interest
control rules separately. Therefore, these studies fail to answer the relevant question
mentioned above.
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the interactions between income tax-
ation and interest rate control rules under the balanced-budget discipline in a pro-
totype model of real business cycle theory. Unlike most of the foregoing studies,
this chapter treats both fiscal and monetary policy rules in a single model. More
specifically, we introduce money into the baseline real business cycle model with
flexible price via a cash-in-advance constraint. We assume that the fiscal authority
adjusts income tax endogenously in each moment subject to the balanced-budget
rule. In the main part of the chapter, we follow the taxation scheme assumed by
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Guo and Lansing (1998) in which the rate of income tax depends on the individual
income relative to the average income in the economy at large. The key distinction
in this policy rule is whether taxation on individual income relative to the average
income is progressive or regressive. Given such a fiscal action, the monetary author-
ity adopts an interest-control rule under which the nominal interest rate responds to
the current rate of inflation relative to the target level of inflation. As usual, the ef-
fect of interest rate control on macroeconomic stability depends on the sensitivity of
interest rate to a change in inflation. Introducing those fiscal and monetary actions
into the baseline model, we examine the dynamic behavior of the model economy.
Our study presents three main findings. First, if progressive income taxation is
combined with active interest rate control rule (i.e. nominal interest rate responds
to inflation more than one for one), then the economy exhibits equilibrium deter-
minacy, so that we will not observe expectations-driven fluctuations. Second, if the
interest rate control is passive, equilibrium indeterminacy could emerge even under
progressive income taxation. Third, if income taxation is regressive, then the inter-
est rate control rule may play a pivotal role for establishing macroeconomic stability.
In this case, indeterminacy may emerge under both active and passive interest rate
control rules. However, if the interest rate is relatively insensitive to inflation, then
equilibrium indeterminacy can be eliminated even in the presence of strong regres-
siveness of income taxation. Those findings claim that in the general equilibrium
settings with money and capital, it is critically relevant to find appropriate combi-
nations of fiscal and monetary policy rules. Even though the balanced-budget rule
and progressive income taxation may contribute to establishing aggregate stability,
it is still important to select a suitable monetary policy rule to avoid depressing
stabilization power of fiscal actions.
In the existing literature, Guo and Lansing (1998) show that progressive tax may
eliminate the possibility of equilibrium indeterminacy even in the presence of strong
degree of external increasing returns. Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (1997) and Guo
and Harrison (2004) examine the interrelationship between balanced-budget rule
and determinacy of equilibrium. While Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (1997) emphasize
that the balanced-budget with a fixed government spending and endogenous taxa-
tion may generate sunspot-driven fluctuations, Guo and Harrison (2004) claim that
such an unstable behavior can be eliminated if the balanced budget is maintained
by adjusting government expenditure under fixed rates of income tax. These stud-
ies utilize the baseline real business cycle models without money. As for monetary
policy rules, there has been a large body of literature that investigates stabilization
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effect of interest-rate control rule a` la Taylor (1993). Although many authors (e.g.
Benhabib et. al. (2001a)) point out that the interest control rule may easily produce
expectations-driven fluctuations in the economies without capital, more recent stud-
ies show that the role of interest rate rules for aggregate stability is less relevant in
an economy with capital formation: see, for example, Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005)
and Meng and Yip (2004). These studies, however, ignore the role of fiscal policy.
The present chapter integrates these two lines of research on the stabilization roles
of taxation and interest control.
It is to be noted that several authors have examined interactions between fiscal
and monetary policy rules in the context of new Keynesian models with sticky price
adjustment. Following Leeper’s (1991) modelling, Kurozumi (2005), Linnenmann
(2006) and Lubik (2003) consider the effects of interest rate rule when the fiscal
authority adjusts the rate of income tax to maintain a target level of the government
debt. Those studies, therefore, do not assume the balanced-budget rule in its strict
sense. Edge and Rudd (2007) explore how the presence of distortionary taxation on
interest income affects the sensitivity of interest rate control to inflation and income
necessary for avoiding equilibrium indeterminacy. Although Edge and Rudd (2007)
utilize a sticky price model with fixed rates of income tax, the primary concern of
their study is close to ours.
5.2 The Base Model
5.2.1 Households
There is a continuum of identical, infinitely lived households with a unit mass. The
flow budget constraint for the household is
M˙ = (1− τ) py + pT − pc− pv,
where M nominal stocks of money, p price level, y real income per capita, c con-
sumption, v gross investment for capital, τ rate of factor income tax, and T is the
real transfer from the government (or lump-sum tax if it has a negative value). Since
we have normalized the number of household to unity, M, y, T, c and v represent
their aggregate values as well. Real income consists of rent from capital and wage
revenue:
y = rk + wl,
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where r is real rate of return to capital, w is real wage rate and l denotes labor
supply. Denoting real money balances m ≡ M/p and the rate if inflation pi ≡ p˙/p,
we rewrite the household’s flow budget constraint as
m˙ = (1− τ) (rk + wl) + T − c− v − pim. (5.1)
The stock of capital changes according to
k˙ = v − δk, (5.2)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the rate of capital depreciation. In addition, a cash-in-
advance constraint applies to consumption spending so that pc ≤M or
c ≤ m (5.3)
in each moment of time. In this chapter, we assume that investment spending is not
subject to the cash-in-advance constraint.
The instantaneous utility of the representative family depends on consumption
and labor supply. Following the standard specification, we assume that the objective
function of the household is
U =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
log c−B l
1+γ
1 + γ
)
dt, γ > 0, ρ > 0, B > 0.
Given the initial holdings of k0 and m0, the household maximizes U subject to (5.1) ,
(5.2) and (5.3) under given trajectories of {rt, wt, τt, Tt}∞t=0 .
To derive the optimization conditions for the household, we set up the current-
value Hamiltonian function:
H = log c−B l
1+γ
1 + γ
+ λ [(1− τ) (rk + wl) + T − c− v − pim]
+ µ (v − δk) + ζ (m− c) ,
where λ and µ respectively denote the costate variables of m and k, and ζ is a
Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the cash-in-advance constraint on consumption
spending. In what follows, we assume that the rate of tax, τ, depends on the level
of individual income. The rate of income tax is thus given by
τ = τ (y) = τ (rk + wl) .
Considering such a taxation rule, we find that the necessary conditions for an opti-
mum involve the following:
∂H/∂c = 1/c− (λ+ ζ) = 0, (5.4)
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∂H/∂l = −Blγ + λ [1− τ (y)− τ ′ (y) y]w = 0, (5.5)
∂H/∂v = −λ+ µ = 0, (5.6)
ζ (m− c) = 0, m− c ≥ 0, ζ ≥ 0, (5.7)
λ˙ = λ (ρ+ pi)− ζ, (5.8)
µ˙ = (ρ+ δ)µ− λ [1− τ (y)− τ ′ (y) y)] r, (5.9)
together with the transversality conditions, limt→∞ ktµte−ρt = 0 and limt→∞mtλte−ρt =
0 as well as the initial conditions on m and k. In conditions (5.4) and (5.5) , τ (y)+
τ ′ (y) y represents the marginal tax rate perceived by the household. As in Guo and
Lansing (1998), we assume that each household takes the proportional tax rule into
account when deciding their optimal consumption plan.
In this chapter we focus on the situation where the cash-in-advance constraint
is always effective, so that c = m holds for all t ≥ 0. First, (5.6) means that µ = λ
so that from (5.8) and (5.9) we obtain:
ζ = λ {[1− τ (y)− τ ′ (y) y] r + pi − δ} . (5.10)
Thus (5.4) is written as
1
c
= λ {1 + [1− τ (y)− τ ′ (y) y] r + pi − δ} . (5.11)
As a result, (5.5) and (5.10) yields:
clγB =
[1− τ (y)− τ ′ (y) y]w
1 + [1− τ (y)− τ ′ (y) y] r + pi − δ . (5.12)
The left-hand side of the above is the marginal rate of substitution between con-
sumption and the labor and the right-hand side expresses the effective, after-tax
rate of real wage rate. Since we assume that the cash-in-advance constraint always
binds, additional consumption generates an additional opportunity cost of holding
money, which is given by the after-tax, net rate of return to capital plus the rate of
inflation. Thus the right-hand side of (5.12) expresses the real wage rate in terms
of the effective price including the cost of money holding.
5.2.2 Firms
The production side of the model economy follows the standard formulation. There
are identical, infinitely many firms and the total number of firms is normalized to
one. The production function of an individual firms is given by
y = Akαl1−α, 0 < α < 1, A > 0. (5.13)
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In a competitive economy we consider, α represents the income share of capital.
We focus on the case where α has an empirically plausible value, so that in what
follows, we assume that α is less than 0.5. The commodity market is assumed to
be competitive and thus the rate of return to capital and the real wage equal the
marginal products of capital and labor, respectively:
r = αAkfα−1l1−α = α
y
k
, (5.14)
w = (1− α)Akαl−α = (1− α) y
l
. (5.15)
5.2.3 Policy Rules
The fiscal and monetary authorities respectively control the rate of income tax, τ,
and the nominal interest rate, R, according to their own policy rules. As assumed by
Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (1997) and Guo and Lansing (1998), the fiscal authority
follows the balanced budget discipline. To emphasize this assumption, we assume
away government debt. The flow budget constraint for the government is thus given
by
τy + m˙+ pim = g + T,
where g denotes the government’s consumption spending. A key assumption of
our analysis is that under the balanced-budget rule the fiscal authority cannot use
seigniorage income to finance the government consumption.1 This means that
g = τy (5.16)
holds in each moment. As a consequence, the real seigniorage income, M˙/p, is
transferred back to the households, so that m˙+ pim = T.
Given the general principle mentioned above, the monetary authority is assumed
to follow an interest rate control rule such that
R (pi) = pi + r∗
( pi
pi∗
)η
, r∗ > 0, pi∗ ≥ 0, (5.17)
where r∗ > 0 is the steady-state level of net rate of return to capital and pi∗ expresses
the target rate of inflation. We assume that the target rate of inflation is positive so
that pi∗ is a positive constant set by the monetary authority. Under given r∗ and pi∗,
we see that R′ (pi) > 1 (resp. R′ (pi) < 1) according to η > 0 (resp. η < 0) . Hence,
if η > 0, then the monetary authority adopts an active control rule under which it
1Hence, fiscal policy is ’passive’ in the sense of Leeper (1991).
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adjusts the nominal interest rate more than one for one with inflation. Conversely,
when when η < 0, the interest rate control is passive in the sense that the monetary
authority changes the nominal interest rate less than one for one with inflation.
When η = 0, the monetary authority controls the nominal interest rate to keep the
real interest rate at the rate of r∗. Notice that the Fisher equation gives the relation
between the nominal and real interest in such a way that
R = r + pi. (5.18)
Therefore, (5.17) and (5.18) yield:
pi =
( r
r∗
) 1
η
pi∗, (5.19)
which gives the relation between the equilibrium rate of inflation and the real rate
of return to capital. This means that in our setting the nominal interest rate control
is to adjust the rate of inflation tax according to a specified rule.2
As for the fiscal rule under balanced budget, we consider two alternative regimes.
One is the taxation rule use the formulation by Guo and Lansing (1998). In this
regime, the government consumption is adjusted to keep the balanced budget and
the rate of income is determined by the following taxation rule:
τ (y) = 1− (1− τ0)
(
y∗
y
)φ
, −1− α
α
< φ < 1, 0 < τ0 < 1, (5.20)
where y∗ denotes the steady-state level of per capita income.3 Given this taxation
rule, the after-tax income is written as
[1− τ (y)] y = (1− τ0) y∗φy1−φ.
As a result, if we denote the after-tax real income by I (y) ≡ [1− τ (y)] y, we obtain
I ′ (y)
I (y) /y
= 1− φ.
2In the presence of distortional income taxation, the Fisher equation may be modified: see, for
example, Feldstein (1976). For example, the non-arbitrage condition (5.18) may be replaced with
(1− τ)R = (1− τ) r+pi so that R = r+pi/ (1− τ) . If this is the case, we assume that the central
bank adopts an interest control rule such that
R =
pi
1− τ + r
∗
( pi
pi∗
)η
,
which is compatible with the modified Fisher equation in the long-run equilibrium where pi = pi∗.
As a result, we obtain (5.19) even in the case of modified Fisher condition.
3As shown in Section 5.3.2. the restriction φ > − (1− α) /α ensures that the steady state level
of consumption has a positive value.
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Since I (0) = 0, the above equation means that if 0 < φ < 1, then I ′ (y) < I (y) /y
so that the after-tax income is strictly concave in taxable income y, that is, income
taxation is progressive. Conversely, when φ < 0, function I (y) is strictly convex
and hence, income taxation is regressive. When φ = 0, we obtain the linear taxation
rule under which the rate of income tax is fixed as τ0. It is also to be noted that in
the steady state where y = y∗, the rate of tax is also fixed at τ0.4
The alternative fiscal rule, which is assumed by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (1997),
is to keep the government spending fixed and the rate of income tax is adjusted to
balance the budget. In this case, the rate of income tax is determined by
τ =
g
y
,
where g is fixed at a certain level. Obviously, income taxation in this regime is
strongly regressive, because a higher income reduces the tax rate. While this chapter
mostly focus on the first rule, we briefly discuss this second rule in Section 5.4.
5.2.4 Capital Accumulation
Combining the flow budget constraints for the household and the government yields
the commodity-market equilibrium condition: y = k˙ + δk + c + g. Under the first
fiscal rule the government consumption is endogenously determined, and thereby
the market equilibrium is written as
k˙ = (1− τ) y − c− δk. (5.21)
5.3 Policy Rules and Macroeconomic Stability
In this section we assume that the fiscal authority uses the taxation rule given by
(5.20). We first derive the dynamical system that describes the equilibrium dynamics
of the model economy and explore the stability condition around the steady state
equilibrium.
4Individual tax payment is T (y) = τ (y) y. Given (5.20) , we have T ′ (y) = 1 −
(1− τ0) (1− φ) y∗φy−θ. In the steady state where y = y∗, we see that T ′ (y) = φ (1− τ0) + τ0.
Hence, if
φ > − τ0
1− τ0 ,
then the total tax payment increases with income y. Since income share of capital, α, is less than
0.5 in reality, when φ satisfies φ > −α/ (1− α) , it in general holds that φ > −τ0/ (1− τ0) .
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5.3.1 Dynamic System
In order to derive a complete dynamic system that summarizes the model displayed
above, we focus on the behaviors of capital stock, k, and the shadow value of real
money balances, λ. First observe that (5.20) gives
1− τ (y)− τ ′ (y) y = (1− τ0) (1− φ)
(
y∗
y
)φ
.
Using the above equation, together with (5.5) and (5.15) , we may express the equi-
librium level of employment in the following way:
l =
[
(1− τ0) (1− φ) (1− α)
B
] 1
1+γ
y∗
φ
1+γ y
1−φ
1+γ λ
1
1+γ .
Inserting the above into the production function (5.13) and solving it with respect
to y, we obtain
y = Aˆk
α(1+γ)
∆ λ
1−α
∆ ≡ y (k, λ) , (5.22)
where
∆ = α + γ + φ(1− α),
Aˆ = A
1+γ
∆
[
(1− τ0)(1− φ)(1− α)
B
] 1−α
∆
y∗
φ(1−α)
∆ .
Equation (5.22) represents the short-run production function under a given level of
y∗. Similarly, the real interest rate is expressed as
r = α
y
k
= αAˆk−
(1−α)(γ+φ)
∆ λ
1−α
∆ ,
implying that the after-tax marginal rate of return to capital is
(1− τ − τ ′y) r = α (1− τ0) (1− φ) y∗φAˆ1−φk
αγ(1−φ)−(γ+φ)
∆ λ
(1−φ)(1−α)
∆
≡ rˆ (k, λ) .
For determining the equilibrium rate of inflation, in view of (5.14) , (5.19) and
(5.22) , we may express pi as a function of k and λ in such a way that
pi = pi∗
(
αAˆ
r∗
) 1
η
k
− (1−α)(γ+φ)
η∆
λ
1−α
η∆ ≡ pi (k, λ) . (5.23)
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Hence, using (5.23) , we see that the optimal consumption depends on k and λ in
the following manner:
c =
1
λ[1 + rˆ (k, λ) + pi (k, λ)− δ] ≡ c (k, λ) . (5.24)
Summing up the above manipulation, we find that the dynamic equation of
capital stock is expressed as
k˙ = (1− τ0)y∗φy(k, λ)1−φ − c (k, λ)− δk, (5.25)
and the shadow value of real money balances changes according to
λ˙ = λ [ρ+ δ − rˆ (k, λ)] . (5.26)
A pair of differential equations, (5.25) and (5.26) , constitutes a complete dynamic
system under the interest rate control and the taxation rule with endogenous gov-
ernment expenditure. Note that y (k, λ) and rˆ (k, λ) satisfy
rˆ (k, λ) = α (1− τ0) (1− φ) (y
∗)φy (k, λ)1−φ
k
, (5.27)
pi (k, λ) = pi∗
( r
r∗
) 1
η
= pi∗r∗−
1
η
(
αy (k, λ)
k
) 1
η
. (5.28)
5.3.2 Steady-State Equilibrium
In the steady state where k and λ stay constant over time, it should hold that
pi = pi∗, r = r∗ and y = y∗. It is to be noted that in the steady state, we obtain:
1− τ (y∗)− τ ′ (y∗) y∗ = (1− τ0) (1− φ) .
We should also notice that from (5.22) the production function in the steady state
is given by
y∗ = A¯
∆
α+γ k∗
α(1+γ)
α+γ λ∗
1−α
α+γ , (5.29)
where
A¯ = A
1+γ
∆
[
(1− τ0)(1− φ)(1− α)
B
] 1−α
∆
, (5.30)
and the values of k, c and λ satisfy the following conditions:
y∗
k∗
=
ρ+ δ
α (1− τ0) (1− φ) , (5.31)
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c∗
k∗
= (1− τ0)y
∗
k∗
− δ = ρ+ δ [1− α (1− φ)]
α (1− φ) , (5.32)
λ∗k∗ =
k∗
c∗ (1 + ρ+ pi∗)
, (5.33)
In the above, k∗, c∗ and λ∗ denote their steady-state values. Equation (5.31) is the
modified Golden-rule condition corresponding to λ˙ = 0, while (5.32) comes from the
long-rum market equilibrium condition: k˙ = 0. The modified golden-rule condition
(5.31) determines the income-capital ratio, y∗/k∗, which gives the consumption-
capital ratio, c∗/k∗ by (5.32) . Then the steady-state implicit value of capital, k∗λ∗,
is given by (5.33) . The last condition yields
λ∗ =
α (1− φ)
(1 + ρ+ pi∗) [ρ+ δ(1− α (1− φ))] k∗ =
β
k∗
,
where β denotes the coefficient of 1/k∗. Using the above relation, together (5.29)
and (5.31) , we find that the steady-state level of capital is uniquely determined such
that:
k∗ = A
1
1−α
[
α (1− τ0) (1− φ)
ρ+ δ
] α+γ
(1−α)(1+γ)
[
(1− α) (1− τ0) (1− φ)
B
] 1
1+γ
β
1
1+γ . (5.34)
Therefore, the steady-state value of k and λ are uniquely expressed by all the pa-
rameters involved in the model. Once k∗ and λ∗ are given, the steady-state levels of
c (= m) and l are determined uniquely as well.
The steady-state value of capital given by (5.34) demonstrates that policy pa-
rameters, τ0, φ, η and pi
∗ affect the long-run levels of capital, income, employment
and consumption in a complex manner. However, it is rather easy to derive intuitive
implications of the effects of a change in policy parameters. First, observe that the
degree of activeness of interest-rate control, η, fails to affect the steady-state levels
of capital, employment and income. Second, regardless of progressiveness of income
tax (i.e. the sign of φ) , the steady-state capital decreases with τ0, φ and pi
∗. Third,
(5.31) and (5.32) show that a change in pi∗ will not affect y∗/k∗ and c∗/k∗, so that
it alters k∗, y∗ and c∗ proportionally. Additionally, (5.32) also shows that a rise in
φ increases c∗/k∗, while τ0 does not affect c∗/k∗.
Finally, by use of (5.12), (5.14) , (5.15) , (5.31) and (5.32) , the steady-state rete
of employment satisfies the following relation:
l∗γ+1 =
(1− α) (ρ+ δ) (1− φ)
(1 + ρ+ pi∗) {ρ+ δ [1− α (1− φ)]} ,
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Table 5.1: Policy Impacts on the Steady-State Values of Key Variables
k∗ l∗ y∗ y∗/k∗ c∗/k∗ c∗/y∗
τ0 - 0 - + 0 -
φ - - - + + +
pi∗ - - - 0 0 0
implying that l∗ decreases with φ and pi∗, while τ0 does not affect l∗.
Inspecting the steady-state conditions derived above, we may summarize the
comparative statics results in the steady state equilibrium as follows:
Proposition 5.1 The degree of activeness of interest rate control, η, does not affect
the steady state levels of capital, income, consumption and employment. The impacts
of changes in policy parameters τ0, φ and pi
∗ are shown as Table 5.1.
5.3.3 Equilibrium Determinacy
In order to examine the equilibrium dynamics near the steady state, let us con-
duct linear approximation of (5.25) and (5.26) at the steady-state equilibrium. The
coefficient matrix of the approximated system is given by
J =
[
(1− τ0) (1− φ) yk (k∗, λ∗)− ck (k∗, λ∗)− δ (1− τ0) (1− φ) yλ (k∗, λ∗)− cλ (k∗, λ∗)
−λ∗rˆk (k∗, λ∗) −λ∗rˆλ (k∗, λ∗)
]
.
Since the shadow value of capital, λ, is an unpredetermined variable, if J has one
stable root, the converging path under perfect foresight is at least locally unique.
Thus determinacy of equilibrium is established when the determinacy of J has a
negative value. In contrast, when det J > 0 and the trace of J is negative, there
exists a continuum of equilibria around the steady state. As shown in Appendix
5.A, using the steady-state conditions, we find that the partial derivatives in J can
be expressed by the given parameter values. The trace and determinant of J are
respectively written as:
trace J = ρ− 1
(1 + pi∗ + ρ)∆
ρ+ δ[1− α(1− φ)]
α(1− φ) (5.35)
×
{
[φ(αγ + 1) + γ(1− α)](ρ+ δ) + (1− α) (γ + φ)pi
∗
η
}
,
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det J = −ρ+ δ [1− α (1− φ)]
α (1− φ)
ρ+ δ
∆
[
(γ + 1)(1− α(1− φ)) + φ(1− α)pi
∗
η(1 + pi∗ + ρ)
]
.
(5.36)
where ∆ = α + γ + φ (1− α) .
First of all, it is easy to see that if the target rate of inflation, pi∗, is non negative,
income taxation is progressive (φ > 0) and the interest rate control is active (η > 0) ,
then det J has a negative value, so that the steady-state equilibrium is locally de-
terminate. Similarly, if −α+γ
1−α < φ < 0 (so that ∆ > 0) and η < 0, then det J < 0.
Thus in this case indeterminacy of equilibrium will not emerge either. In addition,
if φ = 0 and the rate of tax is fixed at τ0, then
det J = −ρ+ δ(1− α)
α2
(ρ+ δ) (γ + 1)(1− α) < 0,
implying that, regardless of the monetary policy rules, the dynamic system exhibits
equilibrium determinacy. To sum up, a set of sufficient conditions for equilibrium
determinacy are the following:
Proposition 5.2 (i) Given a positive rate of target inflation, either if income tax-
ation is progressive and interest-rate control is active or if income taxation is re-
gressive to satisfy −α+γ
1−α < φ < 0 and interest-rate control is passive, then the
steady-state equilibrium is locally determinate. (ii) If income tax is flat (φ = 0) ,
local determinacy holds regardless of monetary policy rules.
To focus on the other possibilities of equilibrium (in)determinacy, as clear as
possible, let us assume that the elasticity of labor supply is zero: γ = 0. This
case corresponds to the real business cycle model with indivisible labor analyzed by
Hansen (1985). Given this assumption, we obtain
trace J = ρ− ρ+ δ [1− α(1− φ)]
α(1− φ)(1 + pi∗ + ρ)
[
ρ+ δ + (1− α) pi
∗
η
]
φ
∆
, (5.37)
det J = −{ρ+ δ [1− α (1− φ)]} (ρ+ δ)
α (1− φ)
[
1− α (1− φ) + φ(1− α)pi
∗
η(1 + pi∗ + ρ)
]
1
∆
.
(5.38)
where
∆ ≡ α+ φ (1− α) .
First, assume that income taxation is progressive (φ > 0) . In this case ∆ > 0
and, hence, the necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy is
1− α (1− φ) + φ(1− α)pi
∗
η(1 + pi∗ + ρ)
> 0.
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Table 5.2: Stability Properties under Progressive Taxation
φ > 0
η > 0 D
ηˆ < η < 0 U
η < ηˆ D
D:determinacy, I:indeterminacy, U:unstable
ηˆ = − (1−α)pi∗φ
[1−α(1−φ)](1+ρ+pi∗) (< 0)
The above condition implies that if pi∗ ≥ 0, equilibrium determinacy is established
under the following conditions:
η > 0 or η < − (1− α)pi
∗φ
[1− α (1− φ)] (1 + ρ+ pi∗) . (5.39)
If η satisfies
− (1− α)pi
∗φ
[1− α (1− φ)] (1 + ρ+ pi∗) < η < 0, (5.40)
then we see that det J > 0. It is easy to see that in this case we obtain ρ + δ +
(1− α) pi∗
η
< 0, and, hence, from (5.37) the trace of J has a positive value. Therefore,
if η satisfies (5.40) , the steady state is a source and there is no converging path
around it. Table 5.2 summarizes the patterns of dynamics under progressive tax.
It is to be pointed out that, as shown by numerical examples presented in Section
5.3.5, when 0 < φ < 1, condition (5.40) may not be satisfied for plausible parameter
values. Therefore, the steady state is mostly unstable for the case of −ηˆ < η < 0.
To sum up, in the case of progressive taxation we obtain:
Proposition 5.3 If income taxation is progressive and the target rate of inflation
is non-negative, the perfect-foresight competitive equilibrium is locally determinate,
either if the interest-rate control is active or it is sufficiently passive. Equilibrium
indeterminacy may not emerge in this regime.
Next, consider the case of regressive taxation (φ < 0) . In this case the necessary
and sufficient condition for local determinacy is[
1− α (1− φ) + (1− α)pi
∗φ
η(1 + pi∗ + ρ)
]
1
∆
> 0. (5.41)
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Table 5.3: Stability Properties under Regressive Taxation
− α
1− α < φ < 0 −
1− α
α
< φ < − α
1− α
−ηˆ < η D I or U
0 < η < −ηˆ U D
η¯ < η < 0 D I or U
η < η¯ D I
D: determinate, I: indeterminate, U: unstable
ηˆ ≡ − (1−α)pi∗φ
[1−α(1−φ)](1+ρ+pi∗)(> 0), η¯ = − (1−α)pi
∗
ρ+δ
(< 0) ,
This condition is fulfilled, either if
− α
1− α < φ < 0 (⇐⇒ ∆ > 0) and η > −
(1− α)pi∗φ
[1− α (1− φ)] (1 + ρ+ pi∗) ≡ ηˆ (> 0)
or if
φ < − α
1− α (⇐⇒ ∆ < 0) and 0 < η < −
(1− α)pi∗φ
[1− α (1− φ)] (1 + ρ+ pi∗) ≡ ηˆ (> 0) .
In words, if a relatively low degree of regressiveness taxation, coupled with a high
degree of passive interest-rate control, may produce indeterminacy.
In contrast, the necessary conditions for equilibrium indeterminacy are the fol-
lowing: [
1− α (1− φ) + (1− α)pi
∗φ
η(1 + pi∗ + ρ)
]
1
∆
< 0, (5.42)[
ρ+ δ + (1− α) pi
∗
η
]
φ
∆
> 0. (5.43)
When −α/ (1− α) < φ < 0 (so ∆ > 0) , then both (5.42) and (5.43) are satisfied, if
and only if
−(1− α)pi
∗
ρ+ δ
< η < −(1− α)pi
∗φ
1 + pi∗ + ρ
.
Note that the above condition is necessary but not sufficient for establishing equilib-
rium indeterminacy: if trace J > 0 in (5.37) , the steady state is a source (unstable).
In contrast, if −1−α
α
< φ < − α
1−α (so ∆ < 0) , we find that indeterminacy may
emerge more easily. Table 5.3 gives a classification of dynamic patterns in the case
of regressive taxation.
The following proposition summarizes our finding.
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Proposition 5.4 (i) Suppose that income taxation is mildly regressive and the tar-
get rate of inflation is positive. Then the steady state is locally determinate, either
if interest rate control is sufficiently active or if it is passive. (ii) Suppose that in-
come taxation is sufficiently regressiveness and the target rate of inflation is positive.
Then the steady state holds equilibrium determinacy only when interest-rate control
is mildly active.
5.3.4 Discussion
To obtain intuitive implication of determinacy/indeterminacy conditions displayed
in Propositions 5.2-5.4, let us inspect the optimization condition (5.12) in detail.
Using w = (1− α)y/l, this condition is rewritten as
clγB =
(1− τ0) (1− φ) (1− α) y∗φA1−φkα(1−φ)l(1−α)(1−φ)−1
1 + rˆ + pi
. (5.44)
Under a given level of consumption, c, the left-hand side of (5.44) represents the
labor supply curve and the right hand side is considered the labor demand curve.
Given c, rˆ and pi. If we assume that γ = 0 for expositional simplicity, the labor
supply curve becomes a horizontal line. Hence, if (1− φ) (1− α)−1 = −∆ < 0, the
labor demand curve has a negative slope and thus less steep than the labor supply
curve. In contrast, if ∆ < 0, then the labor demand has a positive slope and is
steeper than the labor supply curve.
Now suppose that the economy initially stays at the steady-state equilibrium.
Suppose further that a sunspot-driven shock makes agents optimistic and households
anticipate that the output and employment will expand. This raises consumption
demand and the labor supply curve shifts upward and, hence, the equilibrium em-
ployment decreases, as long as the labor demand curve does not shift. Remember
that the after-tax rate of return, rˆ, and the rate of inflation, pi, are respectively
expressed in the following manner:
rˆ = α (1− τ0) (1− φ) y∗φA1−φkα(1−φ)−1l(1−α)(1−φ),
pi = r∗−
1
ηpi∗y∗φA
1
η k
α
η
−1l
1−α
η .
These expressions show that an expected increase in l raises rˆ. It also increases
inflation, if η > 0. As a result, the anticipated increase in employment shifts the
labor demand curve downwards. Then the equilibrium employment decrease further,
implying that the initial, optimistic expectation will not be self-fulfilled, because
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product will contract rather than expand. Consequently, such an expectation driven
fluctuations cannot be realized so that equilibrium is determinate.
Notice that if η is negative and its absolute value is small, a rise in employ-
ment yields a sufficiently large decrease in inflation. This may reduces the after-tax
nominal interest rate, rˆ + pi, and therefore, the labor demand curve may shift up.
If such a shift large enough to enhance the equilibrium level of employment, the
initial optimistic expectations can be self-fulfilled. Hence, as Table 5.2 shows, if the
interest rate control is mildly passive, there may exist multiple converging paths. In
contrast, if the interest-rate control is strongly passive so that the absolute value of
η is large enough, a decrease in the after-tax nominal interest rate, rˆ + pi, is small.
As a result, an upward shift of the labor demand curve cannot cancel a reduction
of employment due to an upward shift of labor supply curve. Consequently, if η
is small enough to fulfill η < −ηˆφ, the possibility of equilibrium indeterminacy is
eliminated.
Next, assume that ∆ < 0 so that the labor demand curve has a positive slope.
If the after-tax nominal interest rate, rˆ + pi, is constant, then the initial shift of
labor supply curve due to an increase in consumption raises the equilibrium level of
employment. If we consider the effective real wage, labor demand curve may have
negative slope even if ∆ < 0. In particular, when η has a small positive value, a rise
in l yields a large increase in pi so that the labor demand curve may have a negative
slope. In this case, the initial expectation cannot be self fulfilled. At the same
time, if η > 0, both rˆ and pi are increased by an expansion of employment, which
yields a downward shift of the labor demand curve. Since the labor demand curve
is steeper than the labor supply curve, this shift produces a further enhancement of
the employment level. As a consequence, the initial expectation can be self-fulfilled
and equilibrium indeterminacy emerges. In contrast, if η < 0 and η is close to zero,
a higher employment may lower the after-tax nominal interest rate, implying that
the labor demand curve shifts upward. If this is the case, the equilibrium level
of employment may not increase, which means that the initial expected change in
economic condition cannot be realized. Thus indeterminacy may not emerge in this
situation.
5.3.5 A Numerical Example
To focus on the roles of key policy parameters, φ and η, more clearly, let us inspect
a numerical example. In so doing, we first depict the graphs of the conditions for
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det J = 0 and trace J = 0 in (φ, η) space. In what follows, we still focus on the case
of indivisible labor (γ = 0).
Remembering that ∆ ≡ α+ φ (1− α) and defining
φ˜ ≡ − α
1− α,
we see that sign ∆ = sign
(
φ− φ˜
)
. Note that
sign det J = sign
{
(1− α + αφ)η + φ(1− α)pi
∗
(1 + pi∗ + ρ)
}
if ∆η > 0,
sign det J = −sign
{
(1− α+ αφ)η + φ(1− α)pi
∗
(1 + pi∗ + ρ)
}
if ∆η < 0.
and that det J = 0 holds when the following condition is fulfilled:
η = − φ(1− α)pi
∗
(1 + pi∗ + ρ)(1− α + αφ) ≡ ηd (φ; pi
∗) . (5.45)
Equation (5.45) shows that, given a positive rate of the target inflation, pi∗ (> 0), η
decreases as φ rises. In addition η decreases (resp. increases) with pi∗, if φ is positive
(resp. negative).
To consider the sign of trace J, define
C(φ; pi∗) ≡ ρα(1− φ)(1 + pi
∗ + ρ)∆
ρ+ δ[1− α(1− φ)] − φ(ρ+ δ).
Then it holds that
sign {trace J} = sign
{C(φ;pi∗)η − (1− α)φpi∗
∆η
}
.
This condition is rewritten as
sign {trace J} = sign {η − ηtr(φ;pi∗)} if C(φ;pi
∗)
∆η
> 0,
sign {trace J} = −sign {η − ηtr(φ; pi∗)} if C(φ;pi
∗)
∆η
< 0,
where the locus of trace J = 0 is given by
ηtr(φ;pi
∗) =
(1− α)φpi∗
C(φ;pi∗) .
We set the conventional magnitude for each parameter:
time discount rate (ρ) = 0.04, income share of capital (α) = 0.4,
capital depreciation rate (δ) = 0.05.
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Given those parameter values5, φ ∈
(
−1− α
α
, 1
)
= (−1.5, 1). Assuming that the
target rate of inflation is pi∗ = 0.03, we obtain the following:
φ˜ = −0.67,
ηd(φ; 0.03) = − 18φ
107(6 + 4φ)
.
ηtr(φ; 0.03) =
180φ(7 + 2φ)
−12072φ2 − 2876φ+ 6848 .
Using the numerical results displayed above, we depict the graphical results in
Figure 6 5.1. This figure first reveals that in our numerical example equilibrium
indeterminacy may not emerge as long as φ exceeds −0.67 and, hence, progressive
taxation ensures determinacy regardless of interest control. Second, in the case of
progressive taxation (φ > 0), even though there is a region in which the steady state
is totally unstable (so the equilibrium path is nonstationary), such a region in (φ, η)
space is considerably small. Third, the steady state would be totally unstable if η
is positive and sufficiently small for the case of φ ∈ [−0.67, 0]. Finally when income
taxation is regressive enough to satisfy φ < −0.67, the interest control, i.e. the
magnitude of η, critically affects the stability property of the economy.
5.4 Alternative Policy Rules
In this section, we briefly discuss alternative fiscal and monetary policy rules that
would modify our main findings shown in the previous sections.
5.4.1 Fixed Government Spending
So far, we have assumed that the government consumption is endogenously de-
termined to satisfy the balanced-budget rule. The second scheme of fiscal rule is
that the fiscal authority fixes the government expenditure, g, by adjusting the rate
5The parameters A and B are not needed to derive the steady-state ratios, but needed to obtain
the steady-state value of each variable.
6When depicting graphs in Figure 5.1, we use the following facts. First, note that C(·) > 0 for
φ ∈ (φL, φH) , where φL and φH respectively satisfy −1− α
α
< φL < φ˜ and 0 < φH < 1. Second,
ηtr(·) is an increasing function of φ with a positive value of pi∗ > 0. Moreover, ηtr(·) may move
around the origin in the (φ, η) plane in the clockwise (resp. counterclockwise) as pi∗ rises when
−1− α
α
< φ < φL (resp. φL < φ < 1).
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of tax, τ, to balance its budget. Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (1997) assume such a
balanced-budget rule. If this is the case, the rate of average tax is determined as
τ (y) =
g
y
. (5.46)
Unlike the first rule, when deciding its optimal plan, the household takes the tax
rate τ as given, because y in (5.46) represents the aggregate income rather than an
individual income. In equilibrium, the after tax income is simply given by I (y) =
[1− τ (y)] y = y − g and
I ′ (y)
I (y) /y
=
y
y − g > 1,
implying that income tax is regressive. In this case the after-tax factor prices are
given by
rˆ = (1− τ (y))αy
k
= α
y − g
k
, (5.47)
wˆ = (1− τ (y)) (1− α) y
l
= (1− α) y − g
l
. (5.48)
Since the household considers that τ is exogenously determined, two of the the
first-order conditions for an optimum shown in Section 5.2.1 are replaced with the
following:
∂H/∂l = −Blγ + λ [1− τ (y)]w = 0, (5.49)
µ˙ = (ρ+ δ)µ− λ [1− τ (y)] r, (5.50)
where τ (y) = g/y and g (> 0) is given. From (5.48) and (5.49) ,the instantaneous
equilibrium level of employment satisfies
Blγ+1
(1− α)λ + g = Ak
αl1−α.
There are at most two values of l satisfying the above. In the following we ignore the
smaller level of l because it produces unconventional results (for example, a higher
government consumption increases employment). The higher equilibrium level of l
can be written as
l = l (k, λ; g) , lk > 0, lλ > 0, lg < 0. (5.51)
Using (5.51) , we find that the equilibrium level of output, the after-tax rate of
return are written as
Akαl (k, λ; g)1−α = y (k, λ; g) , yk > 0, yλ > 0, yg < 0,
86 (
1− g
y
)
α
y
k
= α
(
y (k, λ, g)− g
k
)
= rˆ (k, λ; g) , rˆλ > 0, rˆg < 0.
Note that the after-tax rate of return to capital may increase with capital if a higher
k sufficiently reduces g/k. Consequently, the reduced dynamic system is given by
k˙ = y (k, λ; g)− c (k, λ; g)− δk − g,
λ˙ = λ [ρ+ δ − rˆ (k, λ; g)] ,
where
c (k, λ; g) =
1
λ [1 + rˆ (k, λ; g) + pi (k, λ; g)]
,
pi (k, λ; g) = pi∗r∗−
1
η
(
y (k, λ; g)
k
) 1
η
.
The following discussion is essentially the same as that in Sections 5.3.2 and
5.3.3. The key for the analysis is the behavior of the after-tax levels of rate of return
and real wage. In this fiscal policy regime, equation (5.12) is written as
clγB =
(1− α) (Akαl−α − g/l)
1 + rˆ + pi
, (5.52)
where
rˆ = α
(
Akα−1l1−α − g
k
)
,
pi = pi∗r∗−
1
η
(
αAkα−1l1−α
) 1
η .
Notice that
∂ ((1− τ)w)
∂l
= l2 (g − αy)
so that the government consumption is large enough to satisfy g > αy, the labor
demand function represented by the right-hand side of (5.52) increases with l. Again,
assume that γ = 0. According to the discussion in Section 5.3.4, if g > αy, then
indeterminacy of equilibrium is easy to be observed. In addition, if η > 0, a higher
employment caused by a sunspot driven disturbance increases the after-tax nominal
interest rate, rˆ+pi. Hence, the labor demand curve shifts downward, which enhances
the possibility of indeterminacy. If g < αy, then the labor demand curve is negatively
sloped. Even in this case, if η is negative and its absolute value is small, a higher
employment reduces the after-tax nominal interest rate. As a consequence, the labor
demand curve shifts up, under which emergence of multiple equilibrium can remain.
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5.4.2 Factor Specific Taxation
If capital and labor income are taxed separately, we may set the following tax
functions:
τk (rk) = 1−
(
1− τ k0
)(r∗k∗
rk
)φr
, τw (wl) = 1− (1− τw0 )
(
w∗l∗
wl
)φw
,
where 0 < τ k0 , τ
r
0 < 1. Notice that in the case of Cobb-Douglas production function,
we obtain
r∗k∗
rk
=
y∗
y
,
w∗l∗
wl
=
y∗
y
Again, the equivalence between labor demand and supply is described by
clγB =
wˆ
1 + rˆ + pi
,
where
wˆ = (1− τw0 ) (1− φw) (1− α) y∗φw l∗−φwA1−φwkα(1−φw)l(1−α)(1−φw)
rˆ = α (1− τ r0 ) (1− φr) y∗φA1−φkα(1−φ)−1l(1−α)(1−φr)
Therefore, it is easy to see that indeterminacy tends to emerge more easily, if wage
income taxation is regressive (φw < 0) and capital income taxation is progressive
(φr > 0) .
5.4.3 Taylor Rule
Taylor (1993) originally proposes the interest rate control rule under which the
nominal interest rate responds to real income as well as inflation. In our notation,
the original Taylor rule can be formulated as
R (pi) = pi + r∗
( pi
pi∗
)η ( y
y∗
)ξ
, ξ < 1. (5.53)
In this case, the Fisher equation, R = r + pi, gives
pi = pi∗
( r
r∗
) 1
η
(
y
y∗
)− ξ
η
.
Since r = αy/k, the above is rewritten as
pi = α
1
ηA
1−ε
η pi∗r∗−
1
η y∗
ξ
η k
α−1−ε
η l
(1−α)(1−ε)
η
. (5.54)
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When ξ = 0, the equilibrium rate of inflation is pi = pi = A
1
η r∗−
1
ηpi∗y∗φk
α
η
−1l
1−α
η .
Therefore, if the interest-rate control is active with respective to real income, i.e. ξ
has a positive value, then a change in labor employment, l, has a smaller impact
on the rate of inflation under (5.53) than under (5.17) . Hence, when η < 0, a
rise in l yields a smaller decrease in pi in the case of ξ > 0. Therefore, in view of
the discussion in Section 5.3.4, the Taylor type control rule given by (5.53) may
contribute to reducing the possibility of equilibrium indeterminacy.
5.5 Conclusion
We have analyzed the stabilization roles of fiscal and monetary policy rules in a
monetary real business cycle model with flexible price adjustment. In this chapter,
we have assumed that the rate of income tax is endogenously adjusted to balance the
government budget, while the monetary authority uses the Taylor-type interest-rate
control scheme. Our investigation reveals that in the context of a simple real busi-
ness cycle model we use, equilibrium determinacy depends heavily on the taxation
rule rather than on monetary policy rule. In particular, as suggested by our numer-
ical example, progressive taxation under balanced-budget rule tends to eliminate
the possibility of equilibrium indeterminacy regardless of activeness of interest-rate
control. On the contrary, if income taxation is regressive, whether interest-rate rule
is active or passive may be pivotal to hold equilibrium determinacy. Since the effects
of regressive income tax are close to those generated by increasing returns to scale,
our finding suggests that the role of interest-rate control would be more relevant in
the non-standard situation like regressive taxation or increasing return to scale.
It is, however, to be noticed that our main results emphasized above may partly
come from the simplicity of our model. Our conclusion would be modified, if we
assume more general settings. Possible generalization of the model includes non-
separable utility between consumption and labor as well as a more general form of
money demand (for example, distinction between cash goods and credit goods or
cash-in-advance constraint on investment),.and more general form of interest rate
rule in which the nominal interest rate responds to real income as well as to inflation.
Re-examining our discussion in those extended frameworks deserves further research.
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Appendix 5.A: Detailed Calculation of the Base
Model
The coefficient matrix is expressed as
J =
[
(1− τ0) (1− φ) yk (k∗, λ∗)− ck (k∗, λ∗)− δ (1− τ0) (1− φ) yλ (k∗, λ∗)− cλ (k∗, λ∗)
−λ∗rˆk (k∗, λ∗) −λ∗rˆλ (k∗, λ∗)
]
.
Note that from (5.22) , (5.27) and (5.28) all of the functions y (.) , rˆ (.) and pi (.) are of
Cobb-Douglas forms. Thus we find that the partial derivatives in J are respectively
given by the following:
yk (k
∗, λ∗) =
α (1 + γ)
∆
y∗
k∗
,
yλ (k
∗, λ∗) =
1− α
∆
y∗
λ∗
,
rˆk (k
∗, λ∗) = −φ(αγ + 1) + γ(1− α)
∆
rˆ∗
k∗
,
pik (k
∗, λ∗) = −(1− α) (γ + φ)
η∆
pi∗
k∗
,
piλ (k
∗, λ∗) =
1− α
η∆
pi∗
λ∗
,
rˆλ (k
∗, λ∗) =
(1− φ) (1− α)
∆
rˆ∗
λ∗
,
ck (k
∗, λ∗) = −c∗ rˆk (k
∗, λ∗) + pik (k∗, λ∗)
1 + ρ+ pi∗
,
cλ (k
∗, λ∗) = −(c∗)2[1 + pi∗ + ρ+ λ∗(rˆλ(k∗, λ∗) + piλ(k∗, λ∗))].
As a result, using
y∗
k∗
=
ρ+ δ
α (1− τ0) (1− φ) ,
c∗
k∗
=
ρ+ δ [1− α (1− φ)]
α (1− φ) and rˆ
∗ = ρ+ δ,
we express the trace and determinant of J in the following way:
trace J =
ρ+ δ
∆
((1 + γ)− (1− α)(1− φ))− δ
− c
1 + pi∗ + ρ
(
φ(αγ + 1) + γ(1− α)
∆
ρ+ δ
k∗
+
(1− α) (γ + φ)
η∆
pi∗
k∗
)
=
[
ρη − 1
(1 + pi∗ + ρ)∆
ρ+ δ[1− α(1− φ)]
α(1− φ)
× {[φ(αγ + 1) + γ(1− α)](ρ+ δ)η + (1− α) (γ + φ)pi∗}
]
1
η
.
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det J = − [(1− τ0) (1− φ) yk (k∗, λ∗)− ck (k∗, λ∗)− δ] [λ∗rˆλ (k∗, λ∗)]
+ [(1− τ0) (1− φ) yλ (k∗, λ∗)− cλ (k∗, λ∗)] [λ∗rˆk (k∗, λ∗)]
= λ∗[−c∗ rˆk (k
∗, λ∗) + pik (k∗, λ∗)
1 + ρ+ pi∗
(
(1− φ) (1− α)
∆
rˆ∗
λ∗
)
+ (c∗)2[1 + pi∗ + ρ+ λ∗(rˆλ(k∗, λ∗)
+ pik(k
∗, λ∗)]
[
−φ(αγ + 1) + γ(1− α)
∆
rˆ∗
k∗
]
− δλ∗ (1− φ) (1− α)
∆
rˆ∗
λ∗
= −(1− φ)(1− α)
∆
(ρ+ δ)
c∗
k∗
− c
∗
k∗
ρ+ δ
∆
(
φ(1− α)pi∗
(1 + pi∗ + ρ)η
+ φ(αγ + 1) + γ(1− α)
)
= −ρ+ δ [1− α (1− φ)]
α (1− φ)
ρ+ δ
∆
[
(γ + 1)(1− α + αφ) + φ(1− α)pi
∗
(1 + pi∗ + ρ)η
]
,
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Figure 5.1: Equilibrium Determinacy
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